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ABSTRACT 
Since the events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, emergency management has put great 
efforts into formalizing response and recovery structures following natural and man-made 
disasters. However, these formalized structures are not often flexible enough to allow for 
the innovation that each different disaster may require to best meet the needs of the 
impacted citizens in the most effective and efficient way possible. As emergency 
management continues to become more complex, organizational leadership will be 
challenged to balance the need for standard operating procedures and policies against the 
ability to leverage emergent behavior that allows for innovation in addressing the specific 
problems brought on by each unique disaster. 
This thesis focuses on identifying under what circumstances emergent behavior is 
desired within the context of emergency management, and how organizational leadership 
can impact the factors that enhance or inhibit emergence during response and recovery 
operations. Using participant observation methods over the course of many years of 
disaster leadership, eight different incidents were analyzed for the identification of 
leadership themes that impacted emergent behavior. 
As a result of these findings, five themes emerged in which emergency 
management’s organizational leadership can most effectively impact self-organizing 
behavior within its ranks. With an understanding of when emergence is desirable, and by 
developing the capacity and an organizational culture that supports the vacillation 
between structure and innovation, emergency management officials will be better able to 
lead effective responses to complex incidents. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the past decade, emergency management has changed significantly. It has 
grown to include responses to and recovery from terrorist attacks, such as 9/11, under a 
new umbrella, “homeland security.” Recommendations following events during this time 
have called for increased command and control structures for crisis response. Events, 
such as Hurricane Katrina and 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza, have forced non-
traditional emergency management government entities, such as public health and social 
services, to take a more active role in disaster management. An increased emphasis has 
been placed on incorporating voluntary agencies, faith-based groups, private sector, 
special-needs advocacy groups and pet advocacy groups into disaster planning, response 
and recovery.  
At the same time, response and recovery issues have become much more visible 
in the eyes of the public due to a 24/7 news cycle. Cable news stations’ coverage of 
events, such as the Indonesian Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 
and the 2011 Japan earthquake, tsunami, and ensuing nuclear emergency, provide 
images, stories, and commentaries around the clock. Reporters have leveraged a variety 
of media including traditional television broadcasts with channels devoted exclusively to 
news coverage, as well as websites with both written stories and video clips. Media 
outlets have found ways to engage citizens as storytellers, thus reaching out to them 
almost as extensions of their staff, which was aptly demonstrated during the 2009 
Presidential elections in Iran when the Iranian government attempted to restrict media 
coverage. Citizens filled the gap by utilizing personal communications devices and social 
media to get their story out through media outlets, such as CNN, with its use of “i-
reporters” or through Facebook or Twitter. Web 2.0 technology has ultimately allowed 
citizens to become actively engaged as events unfold to share information, broker 
resources, or simply tell their personal stories to a worldwide audience. 
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Web 2.0 technology is, however, just one way that individuals self-organize 
during times of crisis. Local citizens have always been the true “first responders” often 
initiating notification calls to emergency officials, attempting rescues and beginning first 
aid to victims. Recent history is full of such examples: on 9/11 a group of total strangers 
on Flight 93 worked together to thwart the terrorists’ plot to crash the plane into the 
Capitol or White House; following Hurricane Katrina hundreds of citizens formed what 
was eventually dubbed the “Cajun Navy,” which rescued nearly 4,000 survivors, and the 
cofounder of Acadian ambulance service, Michael Knight, used his 200 ambulances and 
medevac helicopters to evacuate 7,000 people (Stephenson & Bonabeau, 2007). Even 
after emergency personnel arrive on scene and the incident transitions from an informal 
citizen led response to a more formal emergency management led response, citizens 
continue to play a crucial role in the response and recovery process. Through both 
recognized voluntary agencies, such as the American Red Cross or the Salvation Army 
and ad hoc networks, citizens come together in times of need to provide critical services 
to their communities (Palen, Hiltz, & Liu, 2007).  
In an attempt to capitalize on the public’s desire to assist during times of crisis 
and incorporate them into the formalized process, government emergency management 
officials have established programs, such as Citizen Corps and built Citizen Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs), to augment first responders in times of need. Government 
agencies have also incorporated voluntary agencies, faith-based groups, private sector, 
special-needs advocacy groups and pet advocacy groups into disaster planning, response 
and recovery efforts. Although all of these efforts have demonstrated emergency 
management’s willingness to engage the public more frequently in response and 
recovery, their methods for doing so remain focused on accomplishing this through the 
formalized command and control structure. This focus on command and control was 
recommended by the 9/11 Commission through the establishment of a “unified incident 
command system” (Commission, 2003). It was further reinforced following Hurricane 
Katrina, and touted as the best method for improving response to disasters and terrorist 
attacks (Stephenson & Bonabeau, 2007). 
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The challenge lies in that formalized structures for command and control are not 
typically fully understood by ad hoc groups or informal networks that emerge to provide 
vital resources during response and recovery. Low-income residents are less likely to 
have access to the Internet, cell phones, or televisions that officials may use to distribute 
evacuation orders or shelter locations. Elderly people, people with disabilities, and those 
who are unemployed may be more socially isolated than those with active social circles, 
and ultimately leaving them fewer resources for transportation and lodging than others. 
With fewer resources available to them, these vulnerable populations turn to their 
familiar networks, such as family members, churches, neighborhood organizations, or 
local non-profits for help. As a result, these networks form emergent communities to fill 
what they perceive as a gap in services or to augment services. Without the ability or 
knowledge of how to actively interface with the formalized command and control 
structure, the possibility exists for duplication of services, inequitable services across 
communities, inaccurate information being distributed, or worse yet, potential loss of life 
due to an unawareness of impending danger. 
Additional challenges lie within the emergency management community in 
employing emergent or self-organizing behaviors amongst their own ranks. Given the 
significant amount of time, attention and funding devoted to developing comprehensive 
disaster response plans, self-organizing in creative ways during response operations is 
often viewed as a failure to plan effectively (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). 
Further research into organizational leadership’s ability to encourage factors that 
enhance emergent behavior during disaster response and recovery operations can help 
emergency responders innovate when the standard operating procedures are insufficient 
and leverage the public as a resource to emergency management officials as opposed to a 
liability. If more effective ways to encourage emergent behavior within the ranks of 
emergency management are not identified, the profession will be hard pressed to 
interface with the public and empower them to be part of the success of response and 




command and control environments and officials may continue to view citizens as 
victims in need of support services rather than survivors vested in the success of the 
operation. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
When is emergent behavior a desired trait within the context of emergency 
management? 
C. ARGUMENT 
If emergent behavior is desired for the completion of operational responsibilities, 
then organizational leadership should support such behavior through encouraging factors 
that enhance emergence while discouraging those that inhibit emergence. 
Traditional emergency management practices, such as mutual aid agreements, 
memorandums of understanding, and contracting mechanisms, often supply the necessary 
material and human resources for routine disasters that happen on a frequent basis in a 
community, state, region, or nation. Although such a system allows for requesting 
additional resources from the next agency within the hierarchy, various limits exist that 
may impact response and recovery operations, specifically, in unprecedented, or 
“extraordinary” disasters, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks or Hurricane Katrina:  
• demand for a particular resource may exceed the supply on-hand; 
• the timeline for deploying the asset to the impact area may greatly hamper 
response or recovery operations;  
• people in greatest need for resource support may not be able to 
communicate effectively with officials, which leaves them without 
adequate resources 
• the standard operating procedure of the responding agency either 
inadvertently delays the process or it simply does not address the specific 
need.  
Such circumstances lead to a need for greater flexibility in meeting these gaps in 
response and recovery needs of a disaster community. Self-organization, by definition, 
emerges for the purpose of addressing identified needs and is, therefore, well suited to 
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help fill such gaps. For example, the public may have additional resources not available 
to officials or provide innovative solutions for wider distribution or use of existing 
resources. 
Even in “routine” disasters, variables, such as topography, unemployment rates, 
poverty rates, urban versus rural settings, etc., are so extensive as to make each disaster 
unique. As such, each deserves a unique approach to solving the resulting challenges. 
Innovative approaches are driven by the emergency management system's ability to 
encourage emergence or self-organizing behavior both internally amongst its ranks, and 
with the general population. 
History is full of examples where communities have self-organized during times 
of disaster. During the Civil War, Clara Barton identified a gap in the treatment of 
wounded soldiers on the battlefield and rallied women to provide food and bandages to 
both Union and Confederate Soldiers (American Red Cross, 2010). Following the 
unprecedented U.S. earthquake in San Francisco in 1906, Mrs. Anna Amelia Holshouser 
sewed sheets, carpets, and blankets together to make a tent to house herself and her 
neighbors and rallied others to help her run a soup kitchen (Solnit, 2009). During World 
War II, after reading an article on military security, civil engineer Philip Johnston 
recognized a specific need he and others he knew could meet. He utilized his skills in 
speaking Navajo to recruit other Navajo speakers and then persuaded the U.S. Marine 
Corps to pilot a program eventually known as the Navajo code talkers, credited by many 
for the success of the Marines in taking Iwo Jima (Wilson, 1997). More recently, on 
September 11, 2001, over a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, passengers of United 
Airlines Flight 93 self-organized to thwart terrorists’ intent on crashing into the U.S. 
Capitol. Following Hurricane Katrina, hundreds of citizens formed what was eventually 
dubbed the “Cajun Navy,” which rescued nearly 4,000 survivors and the cofounder of 
Acadian ambulance service, Michael Knight used his 200 ambulances and medevac 
helicopters to evacuate 7,000 people (Stephenson & Bonabeau, 2007).  
Despite evidence to the contrary, emergency management officials often state 
groups that self-organize following disasters are disorganized, dysfunctional, opposed to 
public authorities, and inefficient (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985; Kartez & Kelley, 1988; 
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Vieweg, Palen, Liu, Hughes, & Sutton, 2008). In regards to social media forums, 
emergency managers have expressed hesitation in utilizing non-governmental social 
media forums citing concerns that information posted in such sources is not verified and 
could put people at risk if inaccurate information is posted by the public (Palen et al., 
2007). Additionally, research regarding outcome effectiveness is lacking. For example, 
despite thousands of reports geo-tagged on the Ushahidi Haiti site, including 56 people 
trapped in rubble, no available reports, at the time of this writing, have been posted 
documenting how many people were saved because of their reports to the site. 
A command and control model of incident management during disasters was 
recommended by the 9/11 Commission through the establishment of a “unified incident 
command system” (Commission, 2003). It was further reinforced following Hurricane 
Katrina, and touted as the best method for improving response to disasters and terrorist 
attacks (Stephenson & Bonabeau, 2007). Since then, emergency officials have been 
functioning in parallel tracks with self-organizing communities, and rely on the command 
and control model to address potential problems or challenges, with a reliance on pre-
scripted plans, standard operating procedures, or tradition. However, had it not been for 
the self-organized passengers of United Flight 93, the “Cajun Navy” and Michael 
Knight’s Acadian Ambulance Service, many more lives would have been lost as a result 
of those disasters. The public has taken to the use of Web 2.0 technology, and social 
media in particular, to seek information and share resources as another method of self-
organizing during times of disaster. 
Emergency management can identify the balance between the use of command 
and control style leadership and emergent leadership required to innovate. Through 
establishing such balance, emergency management leadership can enhance emergence 
within their own organizations and leverage the public’s desire to self-organize during 
disaster response and recovery as an additional tool to save lives and expedite recovery 
operations. 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis serves to fill a gap in existing research related to emergent behavior 
during times of disaster by focusing specifically on the impact of organizational 
leadership on identified factors that impact such behavior amongst those tasked with 
responding to such events. It adds to the national discussion on ways to build more 
resilient communities through the engagement of citizens at all levels in disaster response 
and recovery in conjunction with an adaptive emergency management system. As a result 
of identifying possible methods for organizational leadership to impact emergent 
behavior during response and recovery operations, future research efforts can be focused 
on creating organizational cultures wherein such leadership techniques are encouraged, 
indeed expected, thereby facilitating the creation of resilient communities.  
 8
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The emergency management landscape has evolved in the past several years with 
officials putting significant efforts into the development of plans and standard operating 
procedures to guide them during disaster response and recovery operations. During the 
same time period, the United States has been faced with unprecedented disasters, such as 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina, which have resulted in consequences far 
beyond what a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is designed to address. In the face of 
these “extraordinary” disasters, or in other words, those that are either catastrophic or 
unusual in nature, many citizens have sought out ways to fill gaps standard processes 
could not meet. Creativity and “outside the box” thinking have also been actively touted 
as necessary characteristics of effective emergency managers (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 
2003). The purpose of this thesis is to determine methods for organizational leadership to 
impact emergent behavior during response and recovery operations following a disaster. 
This review begins by differentiating between terms that have sometimes been used 
interchangeably in literature related to disaster response and recovery: “convergence,” 
emergence” and “self-organization.” By drawing parallels between the different terms, 
this review will support the argument that different terms are often used within existing 
literature to define similar behaviors. Next, the review addresses existing literature that 
identifies factors that may influence convergence, emergence and self-organization to 
understand better how organizational leadership may impact such behavior. Thirdly, 
within the context of self-organization and emergence defined herein, this literature 
review also discusses the role of Web 2.0 technology during disasters. Lastly, the review 
discusses complex adaptive systems and the applicability of complexity theory to 
emergency management to aid in understanding why emergent behavior is desirable in 
some settings, but not so in others. 
A. CONVERGENCE 
Researchers Fritz and Mathewson may have been the first to look closely at the 
concept of convergence as it relates to disaster response and recovery in their work, 
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Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control. According to Fritz and 
Mathewson (1957), convergence consists of “movement toward the disaster-struck area 
from the outside—external convergence—and movement toward specific points within a 
given disaster-related area or zone—internal convergence.” In an attempt to understand 
the motivations of those who participate in convergence activities, they identified five 
major types of convergers: the returnees, the anxious, the helpers, the curious and the 
exploiters (Fritz & Mathewson, 1957).  
Fritz and Mathewson (1957) state that a majority of response tasks are completed 
by the locally impacted population or those neighbors within closest proximity, dubbed 
“the helpers,” when no formal organizations are available and those tasks are gradually 
turned over as formal organizations arrive on scene. However, they also state that disaster 
survivors have indicated a preference for informal solutions to a number of disaster 
needs, such as sheltering or housing, choosing to stay with family or friends, indicating 
the importance of familiarity and intimacy in rendering informal aid (Fritz & Mathewson, 
1957). An additional observation is in regards to the factors that motivate external 
convergers to donate. According to Fritz and Mathewson, evidence suggests that personal 
identification or involvement with an individual or organization within the impacted area 
is more likely to result in donations, which reinforces that familiarity is a factor in the 
convergence of helpers (Fritz & Mathewson, 1957). 
B. EMERGENCE 
According to Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management by Robert 
Stallings and E. L. Quarantelli (1985), emergent groups are “private citizens who work 
together in pursuit of collective goals relevant to actual or potential disasters but whose 
organization has not yet become institutionalized.” They indicate that emergent groups 
are more than the groups of independently acting individuals who converge during 
disasters, such as the helpers described by Fritz and Mathewson, because emergent 
groups develop an internal structure that did not exist previously to accomplish a 
function, goal or task new to them (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985). According to Stallings 
and Quarantelli (1985), emergent groups may appear at any stage in the disaster cycle: 
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preparedness, response or recovery; while convergent groups are a direct result of the 
actual event, and therefore, limited to response and recovery phases. Researchers Kendra 
and Wachtendorf explain that convergence and emergence are in many ways 
complementary: 
Converging volunteers often gravitate toward groups that have emerged in 
response to disasters, either to provide additional support or to perform 
tasks that complement those of emergent groups. At the same time, by 
providing ever-larger numbers of volunteers, convergence sets the stage 
for further emergence. (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2002) 
Although Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) identify several characteristics of 
emergent groups, they do not identify many specific factors that support or inhibit such 
groups from forming or remaining engaged during response and recovery efforts. 
However, they do note, much like convergers, emergent groups tend to form in response 
to a perceived need for immediate action to an issue or problem that appears to be 
unrecognized by others. They state that situational factors, such as presence, when the 
need is identified, or possessing skills and knowledge about the identified gap, impact 
member involvement (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985). Additionally, they state that 
recognition of emergent group efforts by other organizations appears to be a major 
impetus to their sustained involvement (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985).  
Lastly, Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) touch on a possible inhibiting factor to 
emergence. They postulate emergent groups begin with neutral or positive views of 
officials feeling that officials will support them once attention is called to their issue. 
According to their research, hostility only comes after they feel that officials are not 
adequately addressing their plight (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985). However, according to 
Stallings and Quarantelli (1985), officials often view emergent groups as being in 
opposition to their traditional, formalized structure, and thus, create an adversarial 
relationship from the start. 
C. SELF-ORGANIZATION 
Sandra Bloom discusses self-organization in relation to complexity theory in her 
2000 work, Chaos, Complexity, Self-Organization and Us, which focuses on how various 
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systems with several different components can lead to well-organized and patterned 
behavior. According to Bloom (2000), self-organization “is a notion that holds that new 
levels of form, organization, and complexity often arise out of the interchanges between 
organisms and their contexts.” Following this line of thought, researchers Palen, Hiltz, 
and Liu (2007) state that citizens will self-organize through both formal and informal 
networks to provide needed commodities, shelter, or services, such as childcare or 
transportation during times of disaster. This definition considers that self-organization 
may indeed be a result of existing individuals converging within a disaster area to render 
aid, such as the “helpers” described by Fritz and Mathewson (1957), as well as the new, 
emergent groups that form a new organized structure to accomplish a task new to them, 
as described by Stallings and Quarantelli (1985). 
The most significant distinction between self-organization and other terms, such 
as convergence and emergence, is that self-organization refers specifically to a group of 
people that organizes with enough goal or mission clarity to serve as a motivator, but 
leaving procedural boundaries loose enough for individual participation and adaptation, 
which occur as participants learn through formal and informal feedback loops (Seele, 
2001). Therefore, it appears that although subtle distinctions exist between the terms 
“convergence,” “emergence,” and “self-organization,” current literature as it relates to 
disaster response and recovery has often used these terms interchangeably to loosely 
describe groups of people that come together in the wake of a disaster to address a 
perceived unmet need during the response and recovery phases. 
D. IDENTIFIED FACTORS 
A limited amount of research exists regarding emergent behavior of emergency 
responders or emergency management officials during response and recovery operations. 
However, literature is full of examples in which citizens rallied to enable their own 
recovery or to support others and addresses some specific factors that contribute to these 
self-organizing communities. Exploring these indicators and identifying correlations to 
emergency management officials’ behavior may serve as a starting point for discussion 
on how organizational leadership may impact emergence within their own ranks. 
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Researchers Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) identified several examples of 
emergency personnel thinking creatively in the wake of 9/11 to address unforeseen 
challenges. For example, according to the U.S. Coast Guard, nearly 500,000 people left 
Manhattan on 9/11 via some type of boat as part of an ad hoc evacuation. To accomplish 
such a monumental and unique feat, Coast Guard officials at the point of embarkation 
were empowered to use their own discretion to permit boats to exceed certificated 
passenger loads. According to Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003), the Coast Guard example 
is one, “where process was adjusted with respect to ambient conditions and authority 
devolved to personnel closer to the scene for greater flexibility.” Although Kendra and 
Wachtendorf identified examples of emergent behavior and the Coast Guard example 
speaks to empowerment and flexibility as factors that enhanced creative thinking, their 
research was not designed to identify such factors specifically. They did, however, 
recommend further research be conducted to “examine whether or not the same 
organizational factors that impede or facilitate creativity in business settings have an 
impact in the disaster response environment” (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). 
As described earlier, Fritz and Mathewson (1957) noted the significance of 
familiarity and intimacy with individuals or organizations in the impacted area as factors 
that support rendering aid. Furthermore, familiarity and intimacy also applies when 
impacted populations are seeking help from others, who prefer to seek shelter and 
housing from those with whom they are most familiar and intimate before turning to 
other agencies or organizations (Fritz & Mathewson, 1957). Although this research 
indicated familiarity and intimacy were important elements in terms of people who seek 
assistance, it did not address these as potential factors for those offering assistance. For 
example, although it may be assumed that a local church spontaneously opens its doors as 
a shelter during a disaster in response to an identified need in the community, are they 
persuaded to do so based on an intimacy or familiarity with those in need or are their 
doors open to all who seek help regardless of familiarity? Although familiarity and 




emergent behavior, it cannot be ruled out either as it is a logical argument that the church 
may open its doors based on familiarity but keeps them open after the familiars have left 
due to the needs of the remaining shelter residents. 
Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) note that initial factors impacting emergence are 
often situational, such as being present when the event occurs and identification of a 
specific need or gap in service. The next logical situational factor, as Stallings and 
Quarantelli (1985) indicate, is the group’s ability to meet the identified need with existing 
skills or knowledge. However, they also discuss the importance of recognition from 
formal organizations that can aid in emergent groups sustaining their activities. 
According to their research, emergent groups are often inhibited by officials’ initial views 
that they are in some way in opposition to formal, recognized agencies (Stallings & 
Quarantelli, 1985). Researchers Kartez and Kelley (1988) reinforced this factor by 
stating, “municipal law enforcement in particular, (tends) to view volunteer emergence as 
a crowd control problem.” 
Another factor common in the literature that inhibits or enhances self-organization 
based on quantity and availability by the impacted population is accurate, timely 
information about the disaster impacts. It is important to note that timely, accurate 
information from officials is not necessarily enough. In the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) Strategic Foresight Initiative (SFI) Summary 
Findings, dated May 2011, “individuals usually receive confirmation of information 
received from emergency officials from non-official sources before taking action.” 
Additionally, in Recovery in Aceh: Towards a Strategy of Emergence, authors Daniel 
Curran and Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard (2005) state, when impacted individuals have 
good information about conditions within their communities they are more likely to take 
action to address those conditions. Often, lack of accurate information is the need 
identified by self-organizing communities and results in their taking action to fill this 
information gap, which is discussed in greater detail in the following section, “The Role 
of Technology in Self-Organization Following Disasters”. 
Resiliency, an individual's ability to thrive despite adversity, is another term 
frequently referenced as a factor influencing emergent behavior. In the 2001 article 
 15
entitled, Are You Resilient, Rachele Kanigel discusses how individuals can be 
overwhelmed when faced with “impossible adversity” but “challenging experiences over 
time that are just manageable” helps them to build coping skills. Curran and Leonard 
reinforce the balance necessary to maintain resilience in describing Sudan where, 
according to Curran and Leonard (2005), “Violence has depleted social capital and 
human capital so that indigenous capacity for resilience and adaptation has been eroded.” 
When describing self-organizing systems, Bloom (2000) states that when a non-linear 
system cannot maintain equilibrium, it will look for ways to stabilize based on its history. 
Therefore, it follows that a history of resilience in the face of adversity, or “challenging 
experiences over time” as described by Curran, results in greater success at re-
establishing stability while a history of following traditional approaches that do not 
enable resiliency may jeopardize stability. Fikret Berkes (2007) reinforces the link 
between resilience and self-organization as well in Understanding Uncertainty and 
Reducing Vulnerability: Lessons from Resilience Thinking by stating that centralized 
decision making may hinder an organization’s ability to learn from past mistakes.  
Kanigel (2001) summarized a great deal of research related to resiliency by 
articulating a number of common attributes: persistence, an active approach to problem 
solving, optimism, strong social support, flexibility, self-confidence, and a feeling of 
control over their lives. Curran (2005) also states the importance of social support as a 
critical factor of successful emergence, as well as timely, objective information to support 
decision making. The research of Maeseele, Verleye, Stevens and Speckhard (2008) 
support many of these same factors and also includes curiosity and an energetic approach 
to life. Although this small body of literature offers a variety of factors contributing to 
emergent behavior, only two of the studies focused on emergence as it relates to natural 
or man-made disasters. Kanigel’s article is a summary of a number of researchers’ works 
from the past 40 to 50 years related to a wide range of traumatic experiences including 
those of war veterans, victims of violence, and industry deregulation. However, a case 
can certainly be made that extraordinary disasters are also traumatic experiences and the 
lessons learned from research in these areas indeed may have applicability in a disaster  
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environment as well. Therefore, based on the literature related to resiliency discussed in 
this thesis, and its linkage to emergence, it follows that factors that impact resiliency to 
disaster response and recovery activities will impact emergent behavior. 
Very little literature is available regarding factors that inhibit emergence. 
Maeseele et al. (2008) briefly speak to the fact that inadequate, inaccurate, or deliberately 
misleading information disseminated by the government undermines public trust, which 
in turn, causes people to speculate or respond in an appropriate manner. Curran (2005) 
adds that additional factors that inhibit emergence include “an unwillingness to accept 
risk, a fear of failure and exposure, and criticism from within.” 
Recent use of Web 2.0 technology may also shed some light on factors that have 
either positive or negative impacts on emergence. Following the Virginia Tech shootings, 
a Facebook group entitled I’m ok at VT stood up within two hours of the shootings, which 
was followed by many others. Like the California wildfires, despite concerns that such 
sources are not verified, forum members developed roles, structures, and norms that 
guided their behavior (Vieweg et al., 2008). Regardless of officials’ timelines for 
releasing of victim names, lists were compiled on Facebook first, and because of the 
process they had established as acceptable “validation,” the lists were never incorrect 
(Vieweg et al., 2008). As researchers Vieweg et al. (2008) stated in their findings, “The 
phenomenon (of collective intelligence) runs counter to popular mythology around 
disaster behavior of civic post-disaster engagement as hysterical, prone to error, and even 
dangerous—a view that pervades current disaster management policy and technological 
orientations.” 
One significant issue noted by the researchers was Facebook members felt 
exploited when news organizations began contacting them for interviews, noting the 
students had viewed these Facebook sites as communication sites to keep each other 
informed, not something to be “co-opted by others” (Vieweg et al., 2008).  
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E. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN EMERGENCE FOLLOWING 
DISASTERS 
As mentioned earlier, information appears to be a critical factor in self-
organization, either through receiving of accurate information that enables them to take 
positive steps that aid in their recovery, or through a lack of information that may 
mobilize them to action to address that unmet need. Social media sites, such as Facebook 
and Twitter, have facilitated the public's involvement in disaster response and recovery 
by offering a forum for information gathering and sharing. In Back Channels on the 
Front Lines: Emergent Uses of Social Media in the 2007 Southern California Wildfires, 
researchers Sutton, Palen and Shklovski (2008) found that people use information from a 
variety of sources to collect information to inform their actions following disasters. These 
sources included family or friends using mobile phones, websites advertised in traditional 
media, alternative news sources and blogs, and photo sharing sites, such as Flickr or 
Picasa (Sutton et al., 2008). Emergency managers have often been hesitant to use these 
same social media forums citing concerns that information posted in such sources is not 
verified and could put people at risk if the public posts inaccurate information (Palen et 
al., 2007). However, in the 2007 southern California wildfires, Sutton, Palen and 
Shklovski (2008) saw evidence “that community forums were increasingly seen as 
reliable, authoritative sources of information both by community insiders and by 
outsiders.” In fact, local officials and firefighters collaborated with a local community 
website for residents, rimoftheworld.net, in an effort to provide more accurate, current, 
local information as quickly as possible (Sutton et al., 2008). 
The 2010 Haitian earthquake and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan also 
demonstrated a number of ways technology could support public involvement in response 
and recovery efforts regardless of geographic boundaries. Donations to volunteer 
organizations were made via SMS test messaging; Haitians and Japanese in need posted 
their requests and pictures on Facebook and Twitter; humanitarian agencies used these 
same venues for soliciting volunteers and donations.  
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Crisiscommons.org is a global volunteer organization whose mission is to 
“become the leading volunteer organization developing shared technological solutions, 
enabling information sharing in all phases of emergencies with the desire to alleviate 
suffering and loss of life” (Crisis Commons, 2010). One of their collaboration sites, 
Ushahidi Haiti, allowed the public to submit incident reports for categories ranging from 
emergency and public health issues to available services being offered. Reports were 
submitted through SMS text messaging, a web form, e-mail, or Twitter. Photos or video 
links could be added. Volunteers from around the world then took those reports and geo-
tagged them onto a map. They also added to the reports from other resources, such as 
SMS, web, email, radio, phone, Twitter, Facebook, television, list-serves, live streams, 
and situation reports (Ushahidi, 2010). Following the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the 
Ushahidi platform has been used in several international disasters including the 2010 
earthquakes in Chile and New Zealand, as well as the more recent 2011 Japan earthquake 
and tsunami. 
Although such examples provide emergency management officials with the 
potential vehicle for supporting self-organization, they provide little information on the 
specific factors that facilitate such behavior except perhaps aiding in a feeling of actively 
participating in the process of information exchange and validation. Part of the challenge 
may lie in the lack of consistent terminology to define the specific behavior. As 
mentioned earlier, terms, such as “self-organization,” “emergence,” and “resiliency,” 
were not widely associated with disaster survivors until recent years when social theorists 
began applying these traditionally biological and ecological terms to the social sciences.  
F. COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
Complex adaptive systems are systems comprised of many different participants, 
known as agents that are interconnected yet have the ability to learn from their 
experiences, or adapt, through feedback loops with the environment (Eoyang, 2004). 
Several key elements comprise complex adaptive systems. First, complex adaptive 
systems are non-linear meaning the effects are not necessarily in proportion with the 
cause. The interconnectedness between agents results in patterns and structures, which 
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may appear to have minimal effect at the micro level but when observed across the entire 
system, result in macro-level impacts. An example is that of the Butterfly Effect, made 
famous by MIT meteorologist Edward Lorenz. Lorenz discovered, while running 
mathematical computer models for weather forecasts, that very minor changes in one 
element of the data could result in major implications at later stages. The Butterfly Effect 
is the idea that if a butterfly begins flapping its wings in Beijing in March, he could 
drastically change hurricane patterns in the Atlantic by August (Lienhard, 1988). This 
particular example is certainly relevant in the context of emergency management. 
Secondly, effective feedback loops are critical to agents learning from past 
mistakes or taking cues from the present environment or other agents. In the emergency 
management context, these loops often occur through a two-way information exchange 
between officials and the public. When information is either inaccurate or unavailable, 
effective feedback loops are no longer in place and the system either fails, as it is no 
longer able to maintain equilibrium, or citizens emerge and fill the information gap. One 
such example in disaster environments comes from researchers Palen and Liu in their 
2003 paper “Citizen Communications in Crisis: Anticipating a Future of ICT-Supported 
Public Participation,” in which they describe the citizen known as “Ranger” Al following 
the 2003 San Bernardino, California fires. Following the outbreak of fires within his 
community, “Ranger” Al chose not to evacuate and found himself flooded with calls 
from concerned neighbors about the status of their homes when such information was 
unavailable from local officials (Palen & Liu, 2003). Eventually, another person from 
outside the fire evacuation area developed a website and posted the information provided 
by “Ranger” Al, which resulted in more than one million hits (Palen & Liu, 2003). As 
described by researchers Smith and Stevens (1994), effective feedback loops contribute 
resiliency to the systems that remain open to such feedback because they continue to 
sustain their organization, or maintain equilibrium, despite neighboring turbulence. 
Lastly, is the element of emergence within complex adaptive systems. In this 
context, emergence is a global property that arises from multiple non-linear interactions 
between agents and/or the environment (Bennet & Bennet, 2008). The Butterfly Effect is 
an example of emergence. Another example of emergence is when a system slowly 
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changes over time, and due to an unplanned event, reaches a threshold that can no longer 
be sustained and results in large-scale change (Bennet & Bennet, 2008). An example 
within the emergency management system would be Hurricane Katrina. The small, 
incremental changes made over a number of years did not prepare the system for such an 
event, and as a result, large-scale changes to the emergency management system resulted 
including the passing of the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and the 
rewrite of the National Response Plan into a National Response Framework (NRF). 
G.  WHEN IS EMERGENT BEHAVIOR DESIRABLE 
Over the years, emergency management has become more complex with a greater 
number of agents interacting amongst a broad array of events to include natural disasters 
and man-made events to include terrorism. Aided by advent of Web 2.0 technology, 
disasters are no longer bound geographically but have developed more permeable 
boundaries that enable the involvement of many more stakeholders than just those 
directly within the path of destruction. The literature has provided a number of examples 
of emergent behavior in the wake of disasters, but it is important to identify when 
emergent behavior is most desirable and when it is not necessary or perhaps a hindrance. 
According to Bolten and Stolcis in the 2008 article “Overcoming Failure of 
Imagination in Crisis Management: The Complex Adaptive System:” 
Incremental administrative changes are adequate in addressing 
organizational problems and improving effectiveness during periods of 
stability and equilibrium. They are ineffective, however, when “wicked” 
problems alter the decision-making environment because there is little 
room to react to changing conditions. (Bolten & Stolcis, 2008) 
As an example, the effects of Hurricane Katrina would certainly be classified by 
most as a “wicked” problem requiring the ability for innovative solutions to problems 
previously unanticipated, such as a massive levee failure within New Orleans. In such 
situations, emergent behavior is needed to think creatively about potential solutions that 
impact life safety. Emergency management officials must have the flexibility to make 
changes to standard operating procedures or routine processes when doing so enhances 
the resiliency of the system or aids in maintaining its equilibrium. The author argues that, 
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based on her experience, all disasters have some propensity for emergent behavior as a 
desired trait in that the emergency management community should always be striving to 
provide the most expeditious service possible to communities impacted by disasters, 
regardless of what is “typically” done. If standard procedures are estimated to prove 
inadequate to address the problems at hand, new solutions should be encouraged and 
attempted assuming the necessary level of risk that inevitably follows. 
However, not every situation calls for emergence and not every level of risk is 
acceptable. For example, encouraging emergent behavior in the processing of payroll is 
not desirable, the standard operating procedure most likely works fine, and if not, slow 
incremental change that can be evaluated and tested before implementation is a sound 
approach. Emergency management officials should always follow standard operating 
procedures designed to keep people out of harms way. For example, attempting a 
dramatic rescue without proper training and equipment may result in additional victims 
who require rescue or are now at risk of death. By most accounts, the Post Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act was appropriate and necessary legislation 
following the events of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Yet, the legislation itself took more 
than a year to be written and passed, and several more years in some cases before 
changes mandated were implemented. Although many may argue with the pace of the 
implemented changes, the incremental pace did allow for more careful and deliberate 
thought about the ramifications that would follow each change. This change included, in 
cases such as the development of the NRF, a public comment period allowing for a 
finished product more inclusive in its development and production. 
Not every emergency management situation calls for creative thinking and 
emergent behavior. Routine, administrative tasks can usually be accomplished within the 
confines of standard procedures, existing laws, or current regulations. However, during 
disaster operations, programs and services that impact the survivors should always be 
evaluated in the context of that unique situation and emergent behavior encouraged in an 
attempt to provide the right solution at the right time. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
Existing literature as it relates to disaster response and recovery operations 
utilizes terms, such as convergence, self-organization, and emergence to describe groups 
of people who form in reaction to an unmet need in an attempt to fill that gap. This 
situation closely follows the definition of emergence from complexity literature wherein 
emergent behavior is the innovative or unplanned result of interactions amongst agents in 
a complex adaptive system, or a system that has the ability to learn and adjust according 
to feedback loops. 
Not every situation within the complex adaptive system of emergency 
management is appropriate for emergent behavior. Routine, administrative tasks or 
legislative changes lend themselves well to a more thorough and deliberate process of 
incremental change. However, disaster response and recovery duties that are operational 
in nature and have a direct impact on survivors are well suited for opportunities for 
emergence and self-organization. Effective feedback loops and inclusion of stakeholders, 
or agents, allow for enhanced resiliency. 
The literature has offered a number of factors that may impact emergent behaviors 
during response and recovery operations. Enhancing factors include: intimacy or 
familiarity, relevant knowledge or skill set for the problem at hand, recognition by 
officials or others, de-centralized authority or empowerment to the lowest hierarchical 
level possible, timely, accurate information; persistence; an active approach to problem-
solving; flexibility, optimism, self-confidence, and strong social support. Factors deemed 
by the literature to inhibit emergent behavior include tradition, hierarchy or an over 
reliance on formal structures, an unwillingness to accept risk, a fear of failure, or fear of 
criticism. 
Therefore, if emergent behavior is desired during activities impacting survivors 
during response and recovery operations, then emergency management’s organizational 
leadership should support such behavior through encouraging factors that enhance 
emergence while discouraging those that inhibit emergence. This thesis evaluates these 
factors in the context of specific disaster examples wherein organizational leadership 
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attempted to enhance emergent behavior. The results identify recommendations for 
additional research on how organizational leadership can create environments in which 
emergent behavior is most appropriate. 
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
Research for this thesis used a qualitative data approach known as participant 
observation and was conducted within the scope of the researcher’s routine job duties. 
Participant observation has been chosen because it is a method “that attempts to 
understand the motives and meanings of people’s behavior from the viewpoint of those 
involved in the behavior being studied” (Sociology, 2003). According to researchers K. 
DeWalt and B. DeWalt (2002), “Participant observation is a method in which a 
researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of 
people as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines 
and their culture.” Key elements of participant observations include: living within the 
research environment for an extended period of time, learning and using accepted 
terminology, actively participating in a variety of routine events and extraordinary 
activities with other participants, using conversation as an interview technique, 
informally observing during leisure activities; recording observations in field notes, and 
using both tacit and explicit information in the analysis of the data (K. DeWalt & B. 
DeWalt, 2002). As an emergency management professional with more than 20 years of 
experience, the author is in a unique position to leverage the key components of this 
methodology to analyze the available data effectively since the participant observation 
method is primarily interpretive (Sociology, 2003). Therefore, the researcher’s expertise 
within the field increases the likelihood that observations will be evaluated within the 
appropriate context (Smith, 1997).  
To understand better how participant observation is best suited for this thesis, it is 
helpful to look more closely at each key element of the process and its relationship to the 
role of participant or observer. 
A. LIVING WITHIN THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT 
As an emergency management professional for more than 24 years, the author has 
been actively living within the environment she is researching, which allows her instant 
access to other participants within the environment and provides a certain amount of 
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credibility as a participant within the emergency management community. Access to the 
research environment and acceptance or rapport within that environment is often a 
significant barrier to those embarking on ethnographic research. Fortunately, given the 
author’s past and current professional roles, access and rapport are already in place for 
this research. 
Living within the research environment makes it possible to observe behaviors 
and interactions that may not be available to the outsider. For example, individual agents 
may behave differently within group settings, such as meetings than in private settings. 
Someone who appears disengaged or shy may react very differently when engaged in 
conversation with one or two trusted agents. As a result of living within the community 
being researched, observations are based on real events rather than those constructed as 
part of a known experiment and involve intimate details frequently unavailable when 
using other research methods, such as case studies. Ultimately, this lends a level of 
validity and detail to participant observation not always found in other methods. 
B. USING ACCEPTED TERMINOLOGY 
To maintain the relationships and rapport with other participants, the researcher 
must understand and use the accepted terminology from the environment in which the 
individual is actively engaged. The author’s educational background and professional 
training have prepared her to function within the emergency management environment 
effectively, which includes the proper use of common emergency management 
terminology. Her familiarity with the Incident Command System (ICS), the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Framework (NRF), 
legislative mandates and presidential directives allow her to “talk the talk” within the 
professional culture, which also enhances the rapport and credibility amongst other 
agents in the emergency management system. 
C. ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN VARIETY OF EVENTS 
Access to the environment and use of accepted terminology, coupled with the 
author’s role as a leader within the emergency management system, allow her to engage 
in a variety of events actively in which observations relevant to the research of emergent 
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behavior may be captured. As part of her routine professional responsibilities, she 
interacts with other participants in time sensitive, stressful circumstances, such as those 
encountered during disaster response activities, when the primary focus is on life safety. 
Additionally, the author participates in recovery operations, which although certainly still 
maintain a sense of urgency, allow for more deliberate interactions between participants. 
Agents interact within meetings, conferences before and after disaster events, 
organizational recognition events allowing for informal interactions, etc. These numerous 
and varied interactions allow this researcher to gather data in a variety of settings, which 
aids in drawing correlations about the impact of organizational leadership on emergent 
factors by identification of potential patterns of behavior. For example, how a person 
interacts with others when under extreme stress may be very different then interactions 
that occur while at a company picnic. Therefore, observations of these varied interactions 
between agents allow the researcher potentially to avoid jumping to conclusions but 
instead look for patterns that emerge within a variety of circumstances. 
D. CONVERSATION AS AN INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE 
It is through the varied interactions described above that observations occur. One 
significant method for obtaining data is with conversation as an interview technique. By 
engaging other participants in routine conversation, the researcher may accomplish two 
important tasks. First, conversation aids in building trust and rapport with other 
participants as they engage in two-way dialogue sharing information with each other and 
learning about each other. As previously discussed, the degree to which such trust and 
collaboration is established influences the degree to which information gathered is 
dependable and accurate (K. DeWalt & B. DeWalt, 2002). 
Secondly, if the researcher allows the other participant to drive the conversation 
and assumes the role of an active listener, the researcher may gain insight into the 
participant’s point of view. The researcher follows the lead of the participant but 
occasionally asks questions to focus the topic or clarify something the researcher may not 
understand. Data from such conversations are generally captured in field notes, as soon 
after the conversation is held as possible, to facilitate accurate recall of the conversation. 
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E. INFORMALLY OBSERVING LEISURE ACTIVITIES 
Informally observing leisure activities aids in data collection, as described above, 
by helping a researcher look for possible patterns of behavior that may or may not exist 
within other, more structured interactions. This observation can aid the researcher in 
identifying possible influences on the observed behavior, such as environment, number of 
people involved, the influence of stress or tension, and the effect of sedentary versus 
more physical activities, etc. 
F. USING FIELD NOTES 
According to researchers Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw (1995) field notes are used by 
ethnographers to describe, “experiences and observations the researcher has made while 
participating in an intense and involved manner.” K. DeWalt and B. DeWalt (2002) echo 
this sentiment by stating an effective observer must be able to attend to details to ensure 
accurate data collection.  
This researcher maintains a log on all disasters she works and captures details of 
meetings and other interactions, including notes from informal conversations. These logs 
will form the basis of the data and will be augmented by other available products within 
the disaster environment to include: incident action plans, situation reports, e-mails and 
meeting minutes.  
The field notes used within the context of this thesis will be used simultaneously 
for both data and analysis. Field notes are subject to the researcher’s perceptions and 
interpretations. As such, this researcher’s expertise in disaster response and recovery will 
aid in the validity of observational data. 
G. TACIT AND EXPLICIT INFORMATION IN DATA ANALYSIS 
What gives participant observation such an advantage in the study of social 
interactions or behaviors is its ability to incorporate explicit information participants may 
articulate about themselves with tacit information garnered by the researcher engaged in 
participant observation. 
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As researchers K. DeWalt and B. DeWalt (2002) stated, “Living, working, 
laughing, and crying with the people whom one is trying to understand provides a sense 
of self and the other that is not easily put into words.” However, it is this tacit or implied 
understanding that comes from an amalgamation of observed behaviors and interactions 
as documented through field notes and analyzed, through an iterative process, which 
informs the interpretation of meaning. 
Of note, is the iterative nature of data analysis in participant observation. When an 
individual is immersed within a culture, profession, or way of life, it often becomes 
difficult to continually view observed data from a fresh point of view. Therefore, K. 
DeWalt and B. DeWalt (2002) recommend continually examining the researcher’s 
conclusions in light of the overall data by applying a critical eye and the following. 
• Looking for consistencies and inconsistencies amongst participants 
• Checking participant reports of behavior against the researcher’s 
observations 
• Looking for breakdowns by examining data that does support a 
conclusion, as well as data that does not 
• Drawing alternative explanations based on participant views, views of 
colleagues, or existing literature on the topic 
• Examining extreme or contrary data and including them in the analysis, 
rather than excluding them as outliers or irrelevant 
H. SUMMARY 
Participant observation is well suited for research involving social systems and 
social interactions by allowing an “insider’s” viewpoint of the system being analyzed. 
This insider viewpoint exposes the researcher to situations and circumstances unavailable 
to others and allows for collection of enhanced data that is accurate and valid. Through an  
iterative process of reassessing the research questions and hypotheses in light of the data 
being collected and insight gained through its analysis, new hypotheses and questions 
emerge (K. DeWalt & B. DeWalt, 2002). 
This researcher will utilize data from a number of disasters from throughout her 
career and analyze them in the context of participant observation by continually 
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reassessing the validity of conclusions. Tacit information will be made explicit within 
field notes and other analytic notes by using it to aid in the interpretation of nonverbal 
behaviors and better understand agent responses. 
Through this qualitative method, logical correlations will be made between 
factors that enhance or inhibit emergent behaviors and the ability of organizational 
leadership to impact such factors. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
A. OBSERVED INCIDENTS 
The following is a description of various observed interactions amongst 
emergency management practitioners during recovery operations. These interactions 
occurred during a variety of incidents and include observations from the author’s time 
with a government agency, as well as with a non-governmental agency with a role in 
disaster response and recovery operations. Table 1 is used to provide a graphic 
representation of the narrative based on observed factors determined to enhance or inhibit 
emergent behavior as documented in current literature: intimacy or familiarity, relevant 
knowledge or skill set, recognition by officials or others, de-centralized authority or 
empowerment, timely and accurate information, persistence, an active approach to 
problem solving, flexibility, optimism, self-confidence, strong social support, tradition, 
hierarchy or reliance on formal structures, unwillingness to accept risk, fear of failure, or 
fear of criticism. The chapter concludes with an analysis of leadership techniques used 
throughout these situations and their observed effect on emergent behavior. 
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Table 1. Observed Factors That Enhanced or Inhibited Emergent Behavior 
1. Strategic Timeline Exercise 
Part of the standard practice of the observed agency during response and recovery 
operations is for the planning section to develop a strategic timeline wherein each 
operational branch and support section document their relevant milestones for placement 
on a timeline. The resulting product is intended to aid leadership in strategic decisions 
regarding resource allocation, service effectiveness, and expense allocation. Typically, 
the planning section approaches each section and/or branch within the disaster structure 
one on one and requests input from each respective area. Obtaining the input often 
requires repeated requests from the planning section and results in a list of activities from 
each area that are not well coordinated with other stakeholders and, in some cases, are not 
accurate or detailed representations of appropriate milestones. 
In the case of this particular disaster recovery operation, a member of the senior 
staff suggested a new approach to gathering more accurate information in a timelier 
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manner, by engaging the management from each operational branch and section 
collectively. A blank timeline was printed covering six months on large poster-sized 
papers and hung on the wall. The senior staff gathered the leads from each operational 
branch and section in the room and had them sit in a large semi-circle facing the timeline. 
Each was provided with a stack of blank Post It notes with each branch or section 
utilizing a different colored Post it. This staff was asked to each write their respective 
unit’s milestones on the different colored Post It notes. The facilitator had been given 
instructions to allow all the participants to place their respective notes on the timeline 
simultaneously, with the intention of creating an unscripted and perhaps chaotic 
environment for participants to interact. Instead, the facilitator began by asking one 
branch to come to the front of the room, describe what was written on each Post It note 
and place it on the timeline. The branch reporting out began describing in great detail the 
importance of each task and how it related to that branch’s overall mission; however, no 
mention was made of any of the tasks interfacing with other branches or sections. At this 
point, the author interrupted the exercise and asked the facilitator to let everyone come to 
the front of the room at the same time and simply start placing Post It notes on the 
timeline. His expression indicated confusion so the author attempted to clarify by telling 
him, “Make it a free for all.” The author joined the person from one branch, began 
placing some Post It notes of her own and invited everyone to do the same. 
At this point, approximately one dozen participants approached the timeline and 
began placing their Post It notes on the appropriate dates. Another eight to 10 staff 
remained in the semi-circle watching, as they did not have a responsibility to assign Post 
It notes to the timeline. The author and another member of her team placed some 
informal milestones on the timeline, such as National Gone Fishing Day, National Wig 
Out Day, and National Hag Fish Day, in an attempt to keep the exercise lighthearted. 
Throughout the exercise, the author asked both participants and observers what they were 
noticing. One participant stated, “It was like a dance,” while another told a colleague, 
“Wait, if you put that (Post It) there, that impacts mine,” causing him to rearrange his 
milestone accordingly. The entire exercise lasted approximately 45 minutes and resulted 
in a fairly detailed timeline based on input from all of the stakeholders. 
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Several factors that enhance emergent behavior were observed during this 
exercise. First, each participant possessed the requisite knowledge to identify the specific 
milestones within respective areas to document them rapidly on the Post It notes. The 
exercise also demonstrated how interconnected the previously viewed disparate functions 
really were. Although each branch and section had what it perceived to be a clearly 
defined role, and some recognized this role was entirely to support another branch or 
section, the branches that thought they functioned independently of the others seemed 
most surprised to realize their reliance on the actions of others. It also indicated that some 
members of the team might be hesitant to take action in an unstructured environment as 
demonstrated by the facilitator altering the directions. By having each branch present and 
place Post It notes one at a time, it would have followed a linear process focused on the 
individual elements and how they add up to a whole. Instead, the exercise became “messy 
and uncontrolled,” non-linear, demonstrating that it was not the actions of the separate 
agents that make the timeline strategic, but rather the actions of their interplay.  
The non-linear structure of the exercise served to enhance emergence by allowing 
everyone to participate simultaneously. Therefore, the hierarchal nature of the traditional 
command and general staff meeting was no longer in play, perhaps allowing participants 
to feel more empowered and take an active approach to problem solving. Additionally, 
since senior leadership was also actively engaged with placing Post It notes and asking 
questions, participants were likely to feel their efforts were being recognized and 
acknowledged by leadership. Finally, since all branches were actively engaged, strong 
social support resulted as exemplified with one participant referring to the exercise as “a 
dance.” 
One last notable observation was the length of time it took to complete the 
exercise. The spontaneous nature of the tasking coupled with an accelerated completion 
boundary of less than one hour, resulted in a more comprehensive completion of a task 
that previously had taken a week or more. Although the assertion cannot be made that an 
appropriate amount of pressure, in terms of a time limit, was a factor in the success of the 
exercise, it is possible that, coupled with other emergent factors, a sense of urgency may 
indeed enhance emergent behavior. 
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2. Tribal Consultation 
In the author’s capacity with the federal government, she once worked in a state 
that had suffered several disasters impacting most of the state and several federally 
recognized tribes. In many states, relationships between tribal officials and state officials 
are often strained, with tribes wishing to express their sovereignty and maintain their 
tribal identity, while states desiring to be fair to all constituents, worry about a perception 
of favoritism, and consequently, relegate them to the same status as county governments, 
which is a perceived slight by many tribes. In keeping with Executive Order 13175, and 
the Department of Homeland Security's tribal consultation and coordination policy, the 
author worked with the state and her team to design an effective tribal consultation 
strategy for this work during disaster recovery operations. 
The author and her team began by delivering in person an invitation from the 
State Coordinating Officer and the author to join the unified coordination group (UCG) 
within the Joint Field Office (JFO). Since this UCG serves as the lead decision-making 
body within a JFO, it was felt that this action was a tangible way to express commitment 
to the government-to-government relationship held with the tribal partners. This attempt 
required a tremendous amount of trust in the author’s leadership on behalf of the state 
given the past tumultuous relationship between the state and some of the tribes. 
Fortunately, she had worked with these officials before and they had developed a mutual 
respect and trust for each other. After several days of consideration, the state finally 
agreed to the author’s request to include the tribes in the leadership structure. 
Additionally, many of the staff were uneasy with having the tribal nations represented 
equally within the JFO. Some made comments that tribes try to take advantage of 
government assistance, some indicated frustration at some tribal officials’ unwillingness 
to listen and engage in mutually beneficial dialogue. The author encouraged the staff by 
stating this was an opportunity to learn from each other and that she believed if one tribe 
continually displayed inappropriate behavior detrimental to the group dynamic, the other 
tribes would “police” the behavior. 
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In the end, the tribal representatives played critical roles in the operational 
planning and execution of the recovery mission through the collaborative incident action 
planning process. As partners, full advantage was taken of the opportunity to increase 
awareness and educate each other regarding tribal, state and federal policies and 
procedures related to disaster recovery. When one tribe monopolized the conversation 
about a particular topic for several days, the other tribes did indeed “police” them, telling 
them to please “let it go” and move on to other issues. In addition, a better understanding 
of the challenges tribal governments face during disaster response and recovery 
operations was gained. Although the extent of tribal participation varied by tribe, each 
tribe was extended the same offer and indicated its appreciation for being included in the 
command structure. 
Additionally, the author chose to elevate the position of tribal liaison to a direct 
report to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to demonstrate the significance of the 
relationship between the federal government and federally recognized tribes. The tribal 
liaison was empowered as a subject matter expert in tribal relations to lead agency 
program teams and ensure they remained respectful of tribal culture when delivering 
services while simultaneously working to leverage tribal resources in the response and 
recovery efforts. To aid them in their efforts, a tribal task force was created led by the 
tribal liaison and comprised of appropriate program area staff with the skill sets necessary 
to work with tribal partners, such as significant customer service experience, experience 
in effective collaboration, and excellent interpersonal communication skills. The tribal 
liaison attended all meetings and remained engaged in the eligibility for tribal applicants 
throughout the recovery process in the field. The tribal liaison briefed the designated 
tribal point of contact following all meetings and no member of the tribal task force 
conducted visits to the tribe without coordination through the tribal liaison. 
Through effective consultation and coordination with eight federally recognized 
tribes in this disaster, the mutual exchange of information aided in educating each other 
better about respective governmental laws, policies and procedures. As a result of this 
newfound understanding, each respective entity identified best practices and 
opportunities for improvement within its respective policies and procedures for future 
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events. One tribal president said to the author, “The tribe needs to work with the local 
government, the state government, and the federal government but we must have a seat at 
the table.” Through an effective tribal consultation strategy, all impacted tribes were 
offered a seat at the table. 
Several factors listed in the literature as enhancing emergent behavior, and some 
that inhibit, appeared to be at play throughout this process. Careful thought went into the 
decision of who would comprise the tribal taskforce to ensure all members possessed the 
required skill set to implement the taskforce effectively. This expertise was modeled by 
the tribal liaison who was a true subject matter expert in tribal relations and his self-
confidence aided in his ability to lead the taskforce. Staff’s desire to keep with traditional 
JFO structures, perhaps aided by a fear of failure or criticism, made them hesitant to 
embrace the tribes as part of the leadership structure. However, when agency leadership, 
joined by state counterparts, continually acknowledged the relationship and began 
erecting structures to support it, such as the tribal liaison reporting line direct to the FCO 
and having oversight of a specially designed tribal taskforce, staff began to realize the 
recognition from officials this process was garnering. Leadership always remained 
optimistic about the process and the tribal liaison had a level of familiarity, if not with 
specific tribal officials, with their cultures and customs, and thereby, facilitated mutual 
respect. The creation of the tribal taskforce also enhanced a feeling of control by the 
taskforce members as they were empowered to interpret policies broadly to ensure 
processes unique to tribes were considered. Lastly, rather than predicting outcomes, 
flexibility was maintained throughout the process by relying on the learning process 
mutually engaged in to drive actions. This flexibility made it possible to reevaluate 
actions continually to remain focused on the consultative process. 
3. Geographic Divisions 
Approximately one week after arriving at one disaster, the author chose to 
implement a division construct for the recovery operation based on a number of factors. 
Although frequently used within the ICS, organizing into geographic divisions was a 
foreign concept for many of the staff assigned to her operation. Currently, no standard 
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operating procedures exist within her organization for functioning within geographic 
divisions. The only current guidance available is a draft job description for the division 
supervisor position. Therefore, various forms of the structure had been used in prior 
disasters with varying degrees of success. 
In an effort to address the angst of several within the JFO management structure, 
the author held an unconventional command and general staff meeting. A room with no 
tables and only chairs placed in a circle to create an environment with a more flat 
structure as opposed to the traditional hierarchical model was used. The author began by 
explaining her intent to use the division construct for this disaster and stated that she 
understood there might be apprehension, based on prior experiences, in using this model. 
She then stated that the purpose of this meeting was to throw all concerns out openly and 
address them as a team in an effort to create a model that would work effectively on this 
disaster. 
Out of approximately 22 people in the room, two people expressed the most 
concerns and the greatest amount of resistance with the implementation of geographic 
divisions. One provided the example of a prior personal experience in which a division 
supervisor made a commitment on behalf of the program that was unable to be met due to 
program policy. As a result, the staff member indicated that he was “stuck cleaning up” 
the mess the division supervisor had left behind. The other resistant staff person to the 
idea continually expressed his frustration at “adding another layer” to the operational 
structure, and stated that divisions may work well for “response operations” but hinder 
effective “recovery operations.” Both staff indicated their reluctance to have “an 
Operations person supervising my staff.” 
The author shared her personal experience in past disasters that utilized 
geographic divisions. She explained one case in which she was assigned as a division 
supervisor and was told she was the “face of the FCO” with local officials; however, she 
was given no authority over the human and material resources assigned to her division. 
Rather, all elements of command and control remained within the JFO and her role as a 
division supervisor was to liaise with local officials and provide administrative support to 
staff working within her division, such as helping them prepare their timecards or travel 
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vouchers to be sent to the JFO for approval. The author explained the problem with that 
approach was that she had little awareness of the actual activities occurring within her 
division because ultimately all of the division staff reported straight to the JFO. On many 
occasions, local officials would call her with requests or questions, to which she could 
not respond or answer because she was not allowed to direct resources or lacked 
situational awareness of activities happening at the JFO. This lack of awareness proved 
especially problematic during town hall meeting settings at which she was expected to 
answer the questions of local citizens but had no authority to make commitments on 
behalf of the organization to address their concerns. 
The author explained to the team that on another disaster utilizing geographic 
divisions, she saw the challenges in providing too much autonomy to the division 
supervisors. During that disaster, she worked at the JFO where the message from 
leadership was consistently “the division supervisors are in charge.” The problem in that 
case was that division supervisors were making commitments for resources they currently 
did not possess or which required the approval of state officials before implementing. For 
example, one division supervisor provided the JFO with a list of where disaster recovery 
centers were to be placed in accordance with local officials wishes. However, state 
officials decide where and when disaster recovery centers will be opened. Additionally, 
some support for such centers is provided from a strategic level at the JFO, such as the 
contracts for security personnel to reduce costs and increase efficiency. The author then 
explained to the team that it was her intent to find the “happy medium” on this disaster, 
and thus, create an environment that allowed for effective two-way communication 
between field elements and the JFO. 
The author then attempted to address each of the expressed concerns one at a 
time, and looked to the leadership within the room for additional solutions. A method for 
selecting division supervisors was discussed, since no cadre of such from which to 
choose existed. The author explained that she was much more concerned about their skill 
sets in diplomacy, interpersonal communication, and team building than their knowledge 
of specific FEMA programs. Many in the room agreed stating division supervisors would 
be less likely to misspeak about program eligibility if the program was somewhat 
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unfamiliar to them. The author further explained the intention was not to add additional 
layers but rather empower staff as much as possible at the lowest level of the organization 
and provide a bottom-up information and decision loop as opposed to the more traditional 
top-down model normally used in the organization. 
The author explained the key, in her mind, to the success of implementing 
geographic divisions on this disaster would lie in an ability to communicate effectively as 
a team up, down, and across the divisions, branches, and sections. An example of how 
division supervisors would be empowered to make decisions within their division was 
then discussed. The author provided the following scenario and asked for input: 
The State, in coordination with the appropriate Branch at the JFO, could 
decide on dates and locations of disaster recovery centers within each 
division with the support of information provided by the Division 
Supervisors and their staff who ultimately would have the best situational 
awareness about needs, available resources, etc. within the impacted 
communities. Once the schedule has been agreed upon, it would be 
published within the Incident Action Plan. The Division Supervisor would 
then share the schedule with local officials and answer their questions 
regarding federal resources available at such centers.  
The input from staff was that such a construct could work, if indeed everyone 
communicated effectively and frequently to ensure accurate information flow. One 
individual expressed concern that a member of his staff may no longer be “needed” if 
division supervisors began to help coordinate recovery centers. The author tried to assure 
him that perhaps the result would be more of a role change as opposed to his position 
being eliminated. Although the division supervisors would now be responsible for 
ensuring the recovery centers operated efficiently and effectively, the staff person who 
used to do this from the JFO would have greater responsibility for helping to ensure 
effective communication flow up, down, and across, provide technical expertise to the 
division supervisors, and would still retain the responsibility of coordinating schedules 
with his state counterpart. 
The issue of empowerment, the author explained to the group, really comes to 
play in the event of a crisis. If, for example, a disaster recovery center was scheduled to 
close at 5pm one day, and the local mayor called the division supervisor stating that a 
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community that had been overlooked was planning to seek out the recovery center the 
next day, the division supervisor would be empowered to commit to the mayor that the 
recovery center would be open an additional day to meet the needs of the citizens. The 
division supervisor should then immediately call the appropriate branch director at the 
JFO to explain the change in plans and assist in reallocating resources as necessary to 
meet other commitments. The staff in the meeting acknowledged such a process would 
address their concerns about layers and who is in charge. In addition, the author 
reinforced to the branch directors that the division supervisors would be expected to rely 
on the subject matter expertise that those branch directors provided them through 
appropriate staffing of the divisions. Therefore, the division supervisors would not need 
to speak directly to matters of program eligibility because they would have a program 
expert provided by JFO branch directors working for them. The branches agreed that if 
indeed the division supervisors relied on the expertise of the people working for them, 
and they retained their dotted line relationship of providing technical support to those 
same staff, then this would address their concerns. 
The meeting lasted approximately two hours and the two individuals who had 
expressed the most concerns stated they now understood the intent of the design and 
would support the structure. Despite this consensus, problems with implementation 
continued for approximately two to three weeks. The first hurdle came in identifying 
leadership staff for the divisions to include a division supervisor and task force leaders 
from five different branches. For the division supervisors, one staff member from a 
program area that had served as a division supervisor during other disasters with positive 
feedback from subordinates, peers and supervisors was selected. For the two remaining 
positions, two staff members new to the organization but in prior careers had 
demonstrated their leadership capability including key elements of coordination and 
communication were chosen. To offer support to the two new division supervisors, the 
help of a member of one of the JFO sections was enlisted. He had also served as a 
division supervisor on other disasters with positive feedback provided by subordinates, 
peers and supervisors. He agreed to mentor the two new division supervisors in their 
roles. At the same time, the five branches were also identifying a subject matter expert 
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from each of their program areas to serve as task force leaders within each of the three 
divisions. Although all five of these program areas expressed significant challenges 
identifying staff they felt were qualified to serve as task force leaders, all but one filled 
the positions, although due to staff availability, they trickled in over the course of seven 
to 14 days, which ultimately delayed the startup of the divisions in the field. 
One branch proved to be an entirely different matter. The branch director 
continued to state that no task force leaders were available to serve in this role. 
Additionally, he repeatedly told his supervisor, the operations section chief, he did not 
want division supervisors supervising “my staff.” He stated it was his job to approve their 
overtime, sign their travel vouchers, etc. He stated he felt his role was being usurped by 
the division supervisors. Also, he sent an e-mail to all branch staff, approximately 80 
people, in which he described the concept to them as one where the division supervisors 
“have the ability to work on issues like a place for you to fax your time sheets, get 
additional supplies, deal with courier service, broken equipment etc. up in your respective 
areas,” while stating that he continued to be responsible for overseeing the entire 
program. During the same time period, the operations section chief received an e-mail 
from the branch director’s day to day supervisor, when not assigned to a disaster, 
inquiring as to why a division supervisor construct was being used and how was it going 
to be implemented. At this point, the author contacted the senior official at the regional 
office and asked if she had his support for implementation of geographic divisions. She 
explained to him that she was receiving tremendous pushback from two branches in 
particular both of which lie within the same division of the regional office, and that it 
appeared their supervisors in the region were also encouraging resistance to this plan. He 
stated he was in full support of the author’s role as FCO. After the conversation, she 
received a phone call from a regional division director who stated he had been told his 
staff was not supporting the FCO. The author gave him several examples of the two JFO 
branch directors’ resistance to being part of the overall team including stating, “I don’t 
work for Operations” in front of several other staff, deliberately hiding information from 
leadership counterparts, inability to staff the divisions with task force leaders, and an 
unwillingness to relinquish supervision control to division supervisors. The author 
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explained that on more than one occasion, she had been told by the JFO branch directors 
they had discussed these matters with staff in the regional office who agreed with their 
course of action in resisting. The division director apologized, asked how he could help 
support, and requested in the future that the author call him directly when she had a 
problem with someone in his division. 
The author’s analysis of the challenges related to implementation of geographic 
divisions begin with an acknowledgement that many feel the ICS is an extremely rigid 
hierarchical structure due to its reliance on “command and control.” Although that may 
be the case at the local incident commander level, the role of the author’s agency is much 
more about collaboration and cooperation than command and control. Empowering staff 
to the lowest level possible, in this case a geographic division, helps decentralize 
authority and enhances collaboration and cooperation with local officials. Since many of 
the staff were entrenched in the traditional hierarchical command and control model, 
relinquishing control and empowering subordinates was not comfortable for them. Many 
were concerned about repercussions after the disaster from day to day supervisors back at 
the regional office reflecting their fear of criticism, while others expressed concerns they 
would lose situational awareness if people no longer reported directly to them at the JFO. 
In this case, recognition from officials was needed not just from senior leadership within 
the JFO, but also from the senior official at the regional office and the appropriate 
division directors. Once external leadership support was demonstrated to the branch 
directors who had remained hesitant, their resistance became a hindrance to their 
performance in the eyes of others as opposed to an appropriate behavior. Their fear of 
failure was now related to their inability to demonstrate support for the divisions. 
Despite the initial resistance to implementing geographic divisions, leadership’s 
persistence paid off as described below in the examples “Division Team Building 
Exercises” and “Follow-Up Session Regarding Geographic Divisions.” 
4. Division Team Building Exercises 
Since time constraints of a response operation were not applicable, some team 
building exercises were conducted for a week before deploying the division supervisors 
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and their leadership to the field. During that week, each division supervisor met privately 
with each branch director and section chief to do some relationship building including 
listening to their concerns about decision-making authorities, approval of overtime, 
eligibility determinations, and any other items that arose so they could reach consensus 
on how they might effectively collaborate. Next, each division supervisor was asked to 
meet with his or her team members and develop a plan for how to communicate 
effectively with the JFO leadership to further reinforce the need for effective 
collaboration and communication. The teams were told that each division’s plan would 
be considered to develop an overall implementation plan to avoid several different ways 
of doing business. Instead, one overall plan would include the best ideas from each plan. 
Although the intention was for the geographic branch director to meet with the other 
branches and coordinate the overall implementation plan, these meetings did not occur 
due to competing operational needs, and therefore, no written implementation plan was 
ever fully developed or disseminated. 
Lastly, the day before the division teams were deployed to the field, each team 
participated in three different team-building exercises at the JFO facilitated by two 
members of command staff and the author. Each division was told to choose a different 
team leader for each exercise. Each group was given 45 minutes to conduct the exercise 
and debrief as a group before rotating to the next exercise. The exercises were taken from 
the author’s recollections of a leadership workshop she had attended the previous year, 
called True Growth. The instructions she used for each exercise were as follows. 
 
Team Building Exercise 1 
5 Person Teams 
 
All exercise instructions take place out of view from exercise area. Teams have 15 
minutes to complete the exercise and 15 minutes to debrief. 
 
1. Ask the team to identify a team leader. Ask team members to step away while 
instructions are given to the leader. 
2. The entire team will be blindfolded before entering the room  
3. In the room will be a length of rope approximately 30’ long 
4. The facilitator will hand the team leader one end of the rope to begin the exercise. 
  
 45
5. The team leader must walk the team through creation of a 5-pointed star placed on 
the floor (or a table if the team has problems getting up and down from the floor) 
utilizing the rope 
6. Once anyone from the team puts their hand on the rope, they may not remove it. 
They may slide their hand across the rope but they cannot remove their hand (i.e. 
switch hands, etc) 
7. The leader will be given 5 minutes to brief the team and prepare for the exercise 
and 10 minutes to execute their plan. 
8. After team has prepared, have them put on blindfolds and line up behind the team 
leader with their hands on the persons shoulders in front of them 
9. Facilitator leads team into the room winding them around to create confusion 
before leading the team leader to the rope 
10. Facilitator hands team leader one end of the rope and exercise begins 
11. Facilitator should warn team members of hazards (such as walls) if they get near 
12. Facilitator should call out when the team has 10 minutes remaining, 5 minutes and 
a 2-minute warning. 
13. At the end of the exercise (15 minutes) have team remove blindfolds and see their 
result 
14. Debrief the team asking them what they thought went well and what they thought 
needed improvement, particularly as it relates to the team leader. 
Team Building Exercise 2 
5 Person Teams 
 
All exercise instructions take place out of view from exercise area. Teams have 15 
minutes to complete the exercise and 15 minutes to debrief. 
 
1. Ask the team to identify 2 team leaders. Ask team members to step away while 
instructions are given to the leaders. 
2. Explain to leaders that when they enter the play area, they will see 3 hula-hoops 
on the ground. Once team members are assigned to their hula-hoop stations, they 
may not leave their stations during play. They may not move their hula-hoops. 
3. The first hula-hoop contains a photograph. One member of their team should step 
inside the hula-hoop and cover this position. This person is not allowed to speak 
but must communicate to teammate(s) in the second hula-hoop what he/she sees 
in the photograph. 
4. One or more team members step inside the second hula-hoop. They may speak 
and are to describe to the team member(s) at the third hula-hoop what is in the 
photograph held by the person in position 1. 
5. The remaining team member(s) are assigned to the third hula-hoop. They have a 
box of items. Within the box are the items from the photograph. Their job is to 
replicate the photograph as exactly as possible by placing the items into the hula-
hoop as team member(s) from station 2 describe. 
6. The team leaders have 15 minutes to complete the exercise (including explaining 
the exercise to the team and planning their execution). Team leaders participate 
with their teams. 
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7. Facilitator should call out when the team has 10 minutes remaining, 5 minutes and 
a 2-minute warning. 
8. Debrief the team asking them what they thought went well and what they thought 
needed improvement, particularly as it relates to the team leader. 
Team Building Exercise 3 
5 Person Teams 
 
All exercise instructions take place out of view from exercise area. Teams have 15 
minutes to complete the exercise and 15 minutes to debrief. 
 
1. Ask the team to identify a team leader. Ask team members to step away while 
instructions are given to the leader. 
2. All team members except the leader will be blind folded before entering exercise 
area 
3. The team leader will be responsible for leading his or her team through a maze 
carrying a “container” of toxic waste held by ropes requiring proper tension to 
maintain stability 
4. The goals is to navigate the maze and place the toxic waste in an appropriate 
dumping site without dropping the container 
5. The team leader may use verbal directions or help guide the team physically but 
cannot actually move the toxic waste himself/herself. Toxic waste delivery and 
disposal must be accomplished by the team. 
6. If the container is dropped, the team leader is responsible for issuing additional 
instructions to the team about how to pick the toxic waste back up and resume 
movement 
7. The facilitator should tell the team that he/she will notify the team members of 
any walking hazards the team leader may miss as they navigate obstacles. 
8. If team members hear “halt” from anyone, they should immediately stop 
movement until the hazard has been addressed. 
9. The team leader has 15 minutes to complete the exercise, including explaining the 
exercise to the team and planning their execution. 
10. Facilitator should call out when the team has 10 minutes remaining, 5 minutes and 
a 2-minute warning. 
11. Debrief the team asking them what they thought went well and what they thought 
needed improvement, particularly as it relates to the team leader. 
 
The author facilitated the hula-hoop exercise. During the debriefings, she would 
ask staff what they thought their team leaders did effectively, what they thought they may 
have done better, and what were the biggest challenges of each hula-hoop position. In 
general, they were all very complimentary of each other and their work as team leaders or 
subordinates. The consensus from those in the first hula-hoop was that it was  
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tremendously difficult to provide non-verbal direction. Focusing on non-verbal 
communication forced them to communicate outside of their comfort zone but allowed 
them to understand non-verbal communication better as a tool. 
The participants from the second hula-hoop indicated their frustration with not 
being given specific verbal instructions to complete the task, and found that although they 
almost always confirmed their choice with the person in the first hula-hoop, they often 
forgot to check for understanding with the recipients of their message, or those in the 
third hula-hoop. 
The participants in the third hula-hoop agreed it was a tremendous challenge to 
build something based on a vision of a person they could not see or hear, which was the 
person in the first hula-hoop. When the author asked one participant how that felt, he 
answered, “We just had to trust the people in the second hula hoop to tell us what we 
needed to know.” The author then asked if the participants felt this might apply to the 
geographic divisions as well wherein they would need to trust in the division supervisor 
to tell them what they needed to know from the JFO and they laughed and agreed. 
When all of the exercises were complete, the teams were brought together for a 
group debrief about what they had learned going through the different exercises. Their 
comments follow. 
• Communication is key 
• Everyone communicates differently 
• Teamwork 
• Trust 
• Lack of visual situational awareness challenge=frustration and new wise 
words 
• Listening is critical 
• Team Leader Challenges 
• Clear communication 
• Check for understanding with subordinates 
• Knowing names 
• Knowing subordinate skill set for proper placement 
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• Could have used more time in planning exercise 
• “Retreat and regroup” can be good. 
• All groups accomplished same goals in different ways = flexibility to see 
not one way to succeed. 
• Comparison between hula hoop exercise and JFO—Division 
communication 
• Emphasizes need for good hand-off information between shift changes 
(trust) 
• Staying calm good, if too excited or can’t think. 
• Unity of command—listening to team lead critical to reduce confusion. 
• Communicate goals (5-point star) 
• Assumed “good faith” of others (everyone trying). 
• No one gave up!! 
Parallels can be easily drawn between the participant’s comments and the 
identified factors that enhance emergent behavior discussed in the literature. Once again, 
ensuring the facilitators possessed the skill set to facilitate effectively, without directing, 
the exercises proved crucial to allowing the team dynamics to emerge. Effective 
communication was a common theme, which the literature states is a critical factor in 
emergence, either through groups coming together to fill a gap in communications or 
using effective communications to complete their activities and collaborate more 
effectively. In this case, teams also saw effective communications as an element to 
building trust; if someone communicated freely, that individual must be trustworthy. 
Their comments on teamwork and staying calm were on point with the desire through the 
division construct to decentralize and empower field staff, again on point with factors that 
enhance emergent behavior. They took an active approach to problem solving through 
their ability to create new forms of communication when visual situational awareness was 
hampered and through the method of “retreat and regroup.” They developed strong social 
supports through the exercises as exemplified by everyone assuming “good faith” and 
believing in the unity of command. Lastly, persistence was one of the most pervasive 
factors with all participants agreeing that no one gave up, even when unsure if the 
mission was actually being accomplished. 
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5. Follow-Up Session Regarding Geographic Divisions 
Approximately two weeks after implementing geographic divisions, another 
command and general staff meeting was held utilizing the chairs grouped in a circle as 
described earlier. In addition to the staff from the first meeting, the division supervisors 
were invited to attend as well. The goal for the meeting was to develop a table that listed 
the most common activities that occurred within the field based on experiences of the 
past two weeks. Specifics of which elements made sense at the JFO level were discussed 
and which should be coordinated at the field level. The author provided a few examples 
to work from and then the group chose the remainder of items selected. At the end of the 
group session, many indicated this was extremely helpful and wished it had been done 
immediately. The author explained that it might have looked very different had the group 
tried to task everything prior to having local experiences to inform the process and they 
agreed. 
Following the session, the geographic branch director and the experienced 
division supervisor expressed to the author that challenges still existed with one program 
area. They stated that the branch director had not really staffed them with task force 
leaders but rather with people who did not have supervisory skills, and as a result, many 
of the program staff working within the divisions refused to take direction from the 
division team, and preferred instead to work directly with the branch director at the JFO. 
The author asked the division supervisor, the geographic branch director, the appropriate 
section chief and the branch director to join her for a meeting to discuss the problem. The 
branch director insisted that he had tried asking some of his leadership to assume the 
position of task force leaders but they were refusing due to “all of the added 
responsibilities.” The author asked what were the added responsibilities to which he 
replied, “all of the reporting,” and she then asked the division supervisor what reporting 
was being required. He stated he asks only for three items each day: 1) is everyone 
present and accounted for, 2) how many site visits are scheduled for the day, and 3) how 
many projects they plan to write up that day. Upon hearing this, the branch director 
indicated he did not know why some of the program staff refused the duty, as this did not 
seem like a large demand after all. The author asked him what he would do to handle 
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span of control if there were no divisions since he could not effectively support 20–25 
direct reports. He acknowledged that he would have to ask some members of the team to 
take greater leadership responsibilities to assist, and therefore, agreed to go back to the 
program staff and clarify that what was wanted from a task force leader was not a great 
deal of extra responsibility. 
Additionally, the author asked the branch director and the division supervisors to 
hold a joint meeting via conference call with all program staff working throughout the 
state and explain the division construct, the three small pieces of information collected 
daily, and how the task force leaders, division supervisors, and branch director were all 
working collaboratively to provide support, but not competitively. They agreed to do so 
and when the author followed up later that week, several told her that the meeting went 
well, three task force leaders were now in place with the skill sets to supervise others, and 
things were much smoother. The author thanked the branch director for finally showing 
his support of the construct through his actions, despite his personal opinion about its 
place in disaster recovery operations. 
The analysis of this interaction begins, as previously discussed, with the 
observation that an initial unwillingness to accept risk existed, perhaps over concerns of 
failure since despite changes in supervision, one branch director saw program success as 
ultimately his responsibility. He had also expressed great concern about losing 
informational awareness if staff members he typically relied on as direct reports to him 
were now reporting to someone else outside of his chain of command. Although frequent 
reiteration by JFO leadership of the intent of the construct, coupled with leadership 
support from outside of the JFO, certainly aided in assuaging the branch director’s 
concerns, the author believes that it took actual examples of collaboration and teamwork 
before he could fully support the divisions. Through the intimacy and familiarity he was 
building with the division directors, and aided by their engaging him as challenges and 
problems arose, he realized his power was not being usurped but rather leveraged in a 
different way. He had been transformed from a supervisor responsible for telling people 
what to do to an influencer who had the ability to persuade people through dialogue and  
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mutual respect. As in other examples, the resistant branch director possessed the skill set 
to truly lead and motivate a group of people accustomed to reporting to him and 
ultimately encouraged them to give the construct a fair shot at success. 
6. Disaster Assistance Centers (DACs) 
In the author’s initial face-to-face meeting with the state disaster officials, she 
expressed her desire to work collaboratively with them to implement service delivery 
methods based on the needs of the impacted citizens, rather than simply following a 
blueprint based on what had always been done before. For example, perhaps in some of 
the more rural areas of the state, it would make more sense to send in a small team of 
staff to go door-to-door addressing survivor needs as opposed to opening a fixed disaster 
recovery center and expecting survivors to come to the location. The three agreed it was 
important to identify ways to best meet the needs of the survivors in the impacted 
communities and try new models where appropriate. 
When the appropriate branch director and section chief arrived at the disaster, the 
author reiterated her conversation to them that she had with the state. Initially, the branch 
director indicated his agreement, but after consulting with his partners from another 
federal agency in the JFO and his supervisor at the regional office, he returned and 
explained why it was impractical to go door-to-door assisting clients. He explained that 
although the agency may be able to move relatively quickly from house to house, the 
OFA process was quite lengthy and required up to three separate visits with an applicant 
to complete the process. He further explained that prior to the disaster being declared, the 
regional staff had made an agreement with the OFA’s staff that everything done would be 
completed three times to accommodate the needs of the OFA. The author explained that 
although everyone was partners with the OFA, and in most cases, could accommodate its 
needs, each individual also had an obligation to make decisions that expedited services to 
the survivors, and in some instances, the OFA might need to conduct additional visits 
through its own funding if the other needs had already been met, such as the longer term 
centers frequently operated when the agency’s facilities had closed. 
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The author then proposed an alternate approach. In rural areas with low 
registration numbers, a small team of program staff could be sent to a public building, 
such as a local library, to meet with survivors. Prior, the agency staff could go door-to-
door in neighborhoods, as it always did, explaining to survivors what services were 
offered in a fixed DRC and that if all of the services of a DRC were needed, a fixed DRC 
XX miles away in XX county was available to them. However, if there were only a few 
questions for the agency, or the OFA, the local library on XX date from 4 PM to 7 PM 
would be open to answer any questions. Such an approach would allow for a smaller 
number of federal staff to leverage an existing public facility without the need for facility 
leases, contracted security to guard equipment, etc., and thereby, provide an expeditious 
and cost effective method for meeting the needs of survivors. After several renaming 
iterations, the branch director chose the term Disaster Assistance Center to describe these 
small strike teams. Although the final implementation looked different from the original 
proposal, larger teams working full days and making three trips to the site to 
accommodate the OFA, it did prove to be a cost effective way of meeting the needs in 
rural communities where registration numbers did not support large fixed facilities. 
Within this incident, as previously described with others, the author’s team took 
an active approach to problem solving, with all team members committed to identifying 
cost effective service methods that would provide aid expeditiously. With senior 
leadership from within the JFO, as well as leadership from the OFA in full support, there 
remained little disincentive to try the new approach. Additionally, as the branch director 
was very confident in his abilities and his entire team possessed the required knowledge 
to support a DAC, the risk of failure was minimal.  People would still be serviced but 
might simply have to wait longer if the number of community members requiring 
assistance from the DAC were miscalculated. Lastly, senior leadership at the JFO 
remained flexible and empowered the branch director to alter the proposal to something 
he would be more comfortable with, such as larger teams, working longer hours, three 




Although these changes had some negative impact to the cost effectiveness of the original 
proposal, the cost was minimal and the result was buy-in from the entire branch under his 
leadership. 
7. Mobile Disaster Recovery Centers (MDRCs) 
During recovery operations, one of the tools to assist survivors is large 
recreational vehicle with the living spaces converted to office workstations. Each vehicle 
contains approximately eight work stations and is equipped with satellite communications 
for phones and internet connectivity, which allows workers to conduct business 
effectively anywhere it is possible to obtain a satellite signal. These vehicles are most 
frequently used as MDRCs, which, despite their name, are not typically mobile at all in 
some parts of the country, but instead, are pulled up behind a fixed facility, such as a 
church or community center, and satellite communications are used to provide phones 
and Internet to the building so it can be used as a short-term DRC. 
Upon arrival in the state, the author was asked why it was always required to 
identify buildings for the “mobile” disaster recovery centers to work from —why was is 
not simply possible to pull up in a parking lot and take care of people? The author 
explained that she too did not understand and would work with the staff to do just that, if 
possible, to focus on going where the survivors were rather than being reliant only on 
places with water and power restored to buildings. The author called a meeting with the 
DRC Taskforce, comprised of several sections with a stake in recovery centers and the 
branch with primary responsibility for that operation. She asked why MDRCs had to be 
attached to buildings rather than putting them in a parking lot near survivor’s homes and 
allowing their needs to be met on the vehicle. 
First, the author was told it was necessary to use buildings because the vehicles 
were not compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She explained her 
understanding of ADA required access to the services being offered on the vehicle, not 
actual access to the vehicle. Therefore, as long as the staff stepped off the vehicle, staff 
could meet with mobility-impaired survivors underneath the vehicle’s awning at a table. 
The branch director stated that the author was mistaken and the author replied that she 
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would confer with the agency’s disability experts and legal counsel. The author did so 
and received an answer within 24 hours that it was indeed possible to use the vehicle as 
proposed; in fact, the vehicles had been used that way many years prior when first 
acquired. She pulled the DRC Taskforce back together and gave them the information at 
which point the branch director asked for that information in writing. The author 
provided the answer in writing as requested at which point he began explaining that his 
supervisor at the regional office also opposed the idea due to a number of other factors. 
He stated they had safety concerns about being on the vehicle in bad weather. The author 
explained that the vehicle would then simply be closed and appropriate shelter sought just 
as done in fixed facilities during tornado warnings. He stated he had concerns about heat, 
but she told him the vehicles had air conditioning. He stated another federal agency 
needed privacy due to the nature of the information obtained from people and she 
explained the vehicle was no less private than a facility where the OFA sits rights next to 
the staff. The author asked the other sections if they also had concerns about using them 
as mobile units and heard none, except in the case when due to volume, canopies might 
be erected over tables in a parking lot rather than servicing people on the vehicle, in 
which case concerns were expressed about either extreme heat or severe weather. The 
author explained canopies should be a last resort option due to the challenges with 
erecting them and breaking them down each day coupled with weather issues but that 
nothing should not be ruled out. 
Later that day, the author was approached by a section chief who asked two other 
members of command staff and herself to come outside the JFO for an experiment. A 
MDRC had been created in the parking lot and the section chief requested a walk through 
with the author and others posing as disaster survivors. Upon approaching, it became 
apparent the intention was to make the experience as uncomfortable and ill suited as 
possible. The inside of the vehicle was not used as originally discussed, but rather all 
services were placed in the parking lot. The waiting area had no awning, which left the 
staff to role-play as survivors wilting in the hot sun. Signage was hung using paperclips 
so any small breeze would bring banners down on top of people’s heads. The author 
obliged and went through the MDRC as if she were a survivor. Following the exercise, 
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the section chief who had requested this presence outside asked what she thought of the 
role-playing exercise. She explained that he was very creative in providing objections in a 
visual way, but it was clearly staged to be uncomfortable. He agreed, stating the branch 
staff had rearranged everything when he came inside to get the author and the other two 
command staff members. He stated the original plan was to operate the MDRC inside of 
the vehicle and give it a more “true” test of functionality and privacy. Several people 
approached the author and told her privately that many within the branch did not wish to 
staff MDRCs in this manner because they were not as comfortable as fixed sites. In 
addition, it often required them to change hotels more often to keep up with the moving 
of the vehicles instead of staying at a fixed site for several days or weeks at a time.  
Despite JFO leadership’s recognition of this effort and augmented by the support 
of the disability experts and legal counsel, regional tradition of using the MDRCs to 
augment a fixed site were unable to be overcome.  
In analyzing this incident, the author observed strong social support within the 
branch as an inhibitor to the emergent idea, perhaps leaving the branch director fearful of 
criticism by his subordinates for not advocating more for their personal comfort. Perhaps 
he was unwilling to accept the risk of losing favor with some colleagues at the regional 
office and some subordinates, despite the fact that the proposal would have expedited 
assistance to those communities impacted by the disaster. In this case, the importance of 
the mission could not overcome his desire to maintain more comfortable working 
conditions for his staff and his persistence also proved to be an emergent inhibitor as he 
continued to raise new issues each time a previous one was adequately addressed. 
8. Bus Crash 
While working for a non-governmental organization, the author was part of a 
team that responded to a bus crash in a very rural part of a state, not far from several state 
lines. The crash resulted in nearly a dozen fatalities and approximately 25 injured persons 
were transported to hospitals in three separate states. The bus was part of a caravan of 17 
buses transporting approximately 900 people but had separated from the others to take an 
alternate route. Since the crash occurred in a rural area, it was more than 30 minutes 
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before someone came across the crash site and another 30-45 minutes to drive to a 
location that had cell phone coverage and could call 911. This delay in getting help to the 
scene served to traumatize those on board further as they waited in cold, snowy 
conditions for life-saving emergency services to reach them. 
Although a number of challenges on this disaster occurred, one of the most 
significant challenges faced by the author’s agency, the government agencies involved, 
and the charter bus company, was identification of those on the bus that crashed and 
reunification of family members separated by being airlifted to hospitals in multiple 
states. Spouses and friends were separated by hundreds of miles, in unfamiliar 
surroundings.  In one case, two unaccompanied minors were transported to one hospital 
in one state while one parent was transported to a second state and the other parent to yet 
a third hospital in a third state. Unlike airlines, buses are not required to carry manifests, 
and in a caravan situation, people often exchange seats with those on other buses 
throughout the trip to chat with friends or family. Many left their luggage or purses on the 
original bus so they no longer possessed valid identification while others simply lost their 
identification during the accident, which scattered wallets and other personal belongings 
across a wide debris field and over the edge of a mountainous road. 
A representative from the government agency on scene, a representative from the 
bus company and the author collaborated to identify methods for tackling the 
identification and family reunification challenges. First, the private organization that had 
sponsored the trip was contacted but it refused to comment, which indicated a concern for 
legal ramifications, and as such, referred all questions to an attorney. The author then 
tried contacting the travel agency that had made the plans for the group and it did possess 
a list of all 900 people registered for the trip. The agency agreed to send the list to try to 
contact family members. However, if the list were only to be shared with the government 
agency involved or the author’s agency, either internal privacy policies or the Privacy Act 
prevented the sharing of this information with the other responding partners. Therefore, 
the travel agency was asked to send the list to the bus company as it was not bound by 
those same policies or laws and could freely share the list with the rest of the team. 
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Next, the team began working with the hospitals to release information about the 
identification of those they had hospitalized and the status of their release to develop 
plans for family reunification and mental health support. The hospitals insisted HIPAA 
bound them, although the team tried to explain that the author’s agency was exempt from 
HIPAA and not asking for any medical information from the patients. In two cases, this 
explanation sufficed, but in one case, it was only after a personal visit was made to the 
hospital administrator by a federal government official that the hospital recognized it 
could release the information sought without violating HIPAA. 
Once the team had the list of those hospitalized and a general idea of whom else 
was on the impacted bus, it was possible to move forward with plans for family 
reunification, but once again, it took the effective collaboration of all partners. Neither 
the government entity nor the author’s agency had the legal authority or proper funding to 
coordinate family reunification in such an accident. The bus company was willing to 
absorb the costs but did not have a mechanism to complete the task. By working in 
tandem, each accomplished parts of the mission relevant to the respective agencies: the 
government agency coordinated with the TSA to allow the injured individuals to board 
airplanes despite their lack of valid identification, the bus company established a contract 
with the travel agency used by the author’s agency to pay all travel bills. Thus, the 
author’s agency was then responsible for conducting the actual casework needed and 
arranging for family reunification, which allowed for the leveraging of expertise without 
being a part of the exchange of money between the travel agency and the bus company. 
Several factors enhancing emergent behavior were present during this event. First, 
as with all other events described in which factors enhancing emergence were observed, 
the staff all possessed expertise in its respective areas about what its agencies could and 
could not accomplish within the scope of existing laws or policies. Effective 
collaboration amongst the three primary agencies was clearly at play and the team also 
took an active approach to problem solving. The team’s persistence paid off as it worked 
together to define the scope of each agency’s legal authorities, and discovered that the 
limitations of one agency were not always shared by the other agencies. Timely, accurate 
information sharing as the team discovered new obstacles or identified ways around them 
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aided in its success. One potential factor not discussed in the literature, but perhaps at 
play, and worth exploring in greater detail, was the unusual nature of the event and the 
resulting circumstances. Perhaps, when faced with an “extraordinary” disaster, everyone 
felt less encumbered by standard procedures knowing they were not written to address 
the type of circumstances we faced. Perhaps the leaders felt an implied permission for 
risk taking behavior when faced with the extraordinary. 
B. SUMMARY OF OBSERVED FACTORS IMPACTING EMERGENCE 
All eight of the events described previously fall within the category of emergent 
behavior as described within the literature related to complex adaptive systems: the 
innovative result of interactions amongst various agents in a complex adaptive system. 
Present within all six incidents during which factors enhancing emergent behavior were 
observed was the factor of relevant knowledge or skill set. In four of the six incidents, the 
enhancing factors of recognition by officials or others, de-centralized authority or 
empowerment, an active approach to problem solving, and flexibility, were observed. In 
the remaining two examples during which inhibiting factors were present, tradition and 
an unwillingness to accept risk were common to both events. Table 2 provides a graphic 
representation of the results. 
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Table 2. Observed Factors That Enhanced or Inhibited Emergent Behavior 
C. LEADERSHIP TECHNIQUES AND THEIR OBSERVED EFFECT 
In analyzing the leadership lessons learned throughout the incidents, some 
patterns began to emerge that are also reflected in current literature described as “meta-
leadership” or, perhaps more accurately, “enabling leadership.” Researchers Uhl-Bien, 
Marion, and McKelvey (2007) describe enabling leadership as that which works to allow 
the adaptive and learning nature of a complex adaptive system to thrive, and therefore, 
result in innovative approaches or techniques. In general, they refer to five techniques 
enabling leaders leverage to impact emergent behavior positively within their 
organizations: fostering interaction, fostering interdependency, introducing an 
appropriate amount of tension, establishing and maintaining appropriate boundaries 
between more administrative systems, such as those needed to address policy and 
political pressures, and the adaptive systems required for innovation to occur, and they 
manage “up” within their organizations serving as champions to the innovative ideas 
created by the adaptive systems. 
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Many of these concepts are also reflected in literature related to meta-leadership, 
defined by Marcus, Ashkenazi, Dorn, & Henderson (2007) as those leaders who take 
complex problems, and driven by curiosity, facilitate agents across organizations or 
divisions to accomplish shared objectives and “activate that which has not been otherwise 
discovered.” According to Marcus et al. (2007), meta-leadership is accomplished through 
the leader’s ability to leverage the requisite qualities of self-awareness, self-regulation, 
motivation, empathy, and social skills. It is clear that these same attributes are required to 
actively engage the five techniques describes by Uhl-Bien et al. and is described in 
greater detail within each technique. 
1. Fostering Interaction 
Fostering interaction generally requires motivated, self-regulated leadership as 
demonstrated through trustworthiness, and self-aware as demonstrated through 
confidence (Hein, 1999). Leadership can foster interactions between system agents in a 
variety of ways to include: establishing a physical environment that encourages 
interactions and reduces potential barriers created by hierarchy; scheduling opportunities 
for interaction such meetings or establishing rules that require interaction; and closely 
monitoring the environment to understand the forces influencing the system’s ability to 
be adaptive, or learn. 
In each incident observed within this thesis, except for the MDRC incident, 
leadership fostered interactions amongst agents. In several of the incidents, interaction 
was fostered first by scheduling a meeting or exercise requiring the attendance of a 
number of agents. Often, as leadership monitored the environment, it noticed barriers to 
the ability of the agents to interact and took steps to remove the barriers. Examples 
include holding some meetings “in the round” to remove physical barriers of tables and 
perceived barriers of hierarchical titles displayed by table tents, instructing the facilitator 
to “make it a free for all” by allowing all agents to engage simultaneously during the 
strategic timeline incident, or using social skills to establish trust and synergy with 
system agents as demonstrated in the incidents of tribal consultation, geographic 
divisions, and the bus crash. 
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2. Fostering Interdependency 
Fostering interdependency is about creating pressure amongst the agents to act on 
information (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Interdependency occurs because of conflicts between 
agents, as they begin to adjust their respective actions or elaborate their information to 
resolve conflict (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).  This technique is enabled by leadership’s ability 
to self-regulate (Hein, 1999) and resist the more traditional role of “leader as problem 
solver” and allow instead, conflicting constraints from agents to emerge.  In some cases, 
leadership uses their social skills to encourage the sharing of ideas and concerns while 
other times it may set rules designed to foster interdependency, such as assigned 
workgroups. 
Throughout six of the observed incidents, leadership fostered interdependency by 
creating a sense of urgency in some cases, such as the establishment of the DACs, 
wherein agents are compelled to move quickly to meet the needs of community members 
impacted by disasters. By reinforcing the time sensitive nature of recovery centers, it 
forced conflicting constraints to manifest, such as the need for the OFA to visit a site 
three times regardless of the need for the author’s agency to do the same. Leadership, 
while designing the strategic timeline exercise, also fostered interdependence. By 
directing all agents to participate simultaneously, conflicts began to emerge as they 
exclaimed, “Wait, if you put that (Post It) there, that impacts mine.” One of leaderships’ 
most persuasive techniques to foster interdependence comes from allowing for autonomy. 
In the case of the geographic divisions, leadership explained the division supervisors 
would be greatly empowered to resolve issue at the field level. Leadership then 
encouraged each division supervisor to sit privately with each branch director to listen to 
the latter’s concerns and suggestions. 
3. Tension 
Tension also creates an impetus to act and to expand information and adaptability 
(Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). For leadership to introduce tension in a healthy way that drives 
innovation, as opposed to an unhealthy way that creates panic amongst agents, it must be 
self-aware, and therefore, able to manage its own stress levels effectively (Hein, 1999). 
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Additionally, leadership can use empathy to introduce diversity within a team (Hein, 
1999). By introducing diverse agents into the system, the group is often exposed to new 
perspectives, which aids in a group that may be bogged down by consensus or traditional 
methods (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Since conflict drives tension, effective organizational 
leadership must understand the difference between conflicts related to a disagreement of 
ideas versus those based in interpersonal conflict, which can be disruptive to the social 
dynamic of the group (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). 
In four of the incidents observed in this thesis, tension was a tool leadership 
leveraged to enhance emergence, and in one case, the tension may have involved 
disruptive, interpersonal conflict. Helpful tension was created by leadership through 
reinforcing a sense of urgency for mission completion in many cases, such as the timed 
team building sessions or the bus crash. In some cases, leadership introduced tension 
through the inclusion of diverse members of workgroups, such as the tribal taskforce or 
the disaster recovery center taskforce. During the DAC incident, leadership often played 
devil’s advocate with agents continually challenging them to ask “what if.” When they 
expressed concerns, leadership would reply, “what is the worst that can happen from 
trying this approach, people wait in longer lines?” However, in one case, the MDRC 
incident, the individual most resistant kept stating he was not opposed to the idea yet 
continually raised objections. Each time the objection was overcome, he raised others, 
until finally he manipulated the outcome perhaps indicating more of an interpersonal 
conflict as described above than an ideational conflict. In this case, leadership failed to 
recognize the difference at the time, which leads to the belief that agent selection is a 
critical task of organizational leadership when working to create an adaptive system. 
Agents who are flexible, creative, and better able to tolerate ambiguity are likely to be 
more successful members of complex adaptive systems. 
4. Boundaries 
As described by Uhl-Bien et al. (2007), boundaries refer to leadership’s ability to 
manage the interactions between the administrative systems that involve issues, such as 
external politics or top-down preferences, and the adaptive systems that innovate. 
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Effective organizational leadership utilizes empathy, through political awareness, and 
social skills, through personal influence (Hein, 1999) to help manage this boundary 
interface. 
In seven of the eight incidents, organizational leadership utilized techniques 
related to maintaining healthy boundaries between the two systems. For example, in the 
tribal consultation incident, leadership took on the task of managing the external political 
pressures from the state and its hesitance to bring the tribes into the Unified Coordination 
Group to prevent the external pressures from suppressing the adaptive system. In the case 
of the geographic divisions, organizational leadership used its influence to garner support 
from leadership outside of the JFO to help relieve anxiety of agents related to 
implementation of a bottom up structure. In several of the incidents, leadership re-aligned 
agents to the intended mission, not through inhibiting creativity, but rather by asking 
agents to describe the impact of the actions they were discussing. By focusing agents on 
the impact, or outcome, it was easy to evaluate if the impacts lined up with the articulated 
mission. For example, when the mechanistic processes of how the DACs would operate 
began to inhibit the project from moving forward, leadership asked questions, such as 
how having a few more people on the team or staying open a few more hours, impacted 
the outcome. Agents were unable to articulate a significant difference to the mission, but 
leadership also recognized the importance of these two details to team members’ 
motivation, and therefore, remained flexible and allowed the project to realign 
accordingly.  
5. Championing Innovation 
Championing ideas is expressed through leadership’s ability to “manage up” and 
promote innovate ideas within their organizations (Uhl-Bien, 2007). Championing occurs 
when leadership leverages its social skills, through influence, its self-regulation, through 
flexibility and risk taking behavior, and its motivation, through commitment, initiative, 
and optimism (Hein, 1999). It adopts a “pro-innovation” environment by working toward 
the development of policies and strategies that enable emergence (Uhl-Bien, 2007). 
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In four of the eight incidents, organizational leadership leveraged this technique. 
For example, in the tribal consultation, geographic divisions, and DAC incidents, 
leadership within the JFO touted the success of these measures to organizational 
leadership outside of the JFO through publishing success stories in organizational 
newsletters, sharing “best practices” with colleagues in other JFOs, and providing written 
feedback on the challenges, successes, and lessons learned as part of the formal after 
action process that occurs following disaster responses. In the case of the MDRC, 
organizational leadership championed and “managed up” by gaining the support of the 
agency’s disability and legal experts, but fell short in motivating the primary agent within 
the JFO. 
In summary, patterns of leadership behavior were identified through the data 
analysis and fell within five recognized themes from literature: fostering interaction, 
fostering interdependency, tension, boundaries, and championing ideas. Leadership’s 
ability to foster interactions and establish or maintain appropriate boundaries between 
more administrative systems, such as those needed to address policy and political 
pressures, and the adaptive systems required for innovation to occur, were present in 
seven of the eight incidents. Fostering interdependency came next in frequency with six 




Table 3. Leadership Techniques Impacting Emergent Behavior 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In the past decade, emergency management has undergone significant changes. 
What may have once been classified as “routine” disasters have grown into complex 
systems, each possessing unique characteristics that require unique approaches to resolve 
them. Emergency management has partnered with other government entities, such as 
public health, a growing number of voluntary agencies, faith-based organizations, the 
private sector and a wide range of advocacy groups. 
Simultaneously, the general public has demonstrated an interest in becoming 
more actively engaged in disaster response and recovery operations through the use of 
Web 2.0 technology, and the demonstration of self-organized behavior. Current literature 
often uses the terms convergence, self-organization, and emergence to describe groups of 
people that come together following a disaster to a draft perceived unmet needs. To date, 
many professionals within the emergency management community have relied solely on 
the command-and-control structures recommended following the events of 9/11 and 
reinforced after Hurricane Katrina, which left little flexibility to encourage emergence 
within their own organizations yet alone with self-organized citizens.  
This thesis answers the research question, “When is emergent behavior a desired 
trait within the context of emergency management?” Command and control structures, 
hierarchical models, are the norm for many bureaucratic organizations, and have proven 
extremely effective for slow, incremental changes, such as administrative procedures, 
policies, or laws, which allows for more effective evaluation of resulting ramifications. 
However, they lack the flexibility to change quickly during disaster response and 
recovery operations based on feedback from agents within the system or the environment. 
Each disaster impacts the affected population differently due to factors, such as 
topography, unemployment rates, poverty rates, and population density of the impacted 
areas. These variables make each disaster unique, and therefore, require a unique 
approach to addressing the accompanying response and recovery issues. Innovative 
approaches are driven by emergency management’s ability to encourage self-organizing 
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or emergent behavior amongst its own staff, which may also lead to acceptance and 
encouragement of the same behavior within the general population.  
The emergency management enterprise can appropriately be described as a 
complex adaptive system. Such systems are comprised of many different agents, 
frequently interacting and adapting based on feedback loops with each other and the 
environment resulting in behaviors more than the sum of their parts. Complex adaptive 
systems are nonlinear, have the ability to learn or adapt, and possess emergence as a 
global property. 
To best leverage creative problem solving during response and recovery 
operations, organizational leadership within the complex adaptive system of emergency 
management should create environments in which emergent behavior is encouraged. 
Factors that enhance emergent behavior include intimacy or familiarity, relevant 
knowledge or skill set for the problem at hand, recognition by officials or others, 
decentralized authority or empowerment to the lowest level possible, timely, accurate 
information, persistence, an active approach to problem solving, flexibility, optimism, 
self-confidence, and strong social support. Factors inhibiting emergent behavior include 
tradition, hierarchy or an over reliance on formal structures, an unwillingness to accept 
risk, a fear of failure, or fear of criticism. 
Through the ethnographic method of participant observation, eight incidents 
during response and recovery operations were analyzed for the presence of factors that 
enhanced or inhibited emergence. All eight incidents were impacted by the factors 
described with relevant knowledge or skill set the most common enhancing factor, and 
tradition and an unwillingness to accept risk most the two most common inhibiting 
factors. 
The most interesting findings in the data analysis came from the examination of 
patterns in organizational leadership that emerged across all eight incidents. These 
patterns fell within five categories of leadership techniques deemed effective for 
supporting environments in which emergence can occur: fostering interaction, fostering 
interdependency, introducing an appropriate amount of tension, establishing or 
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maintaining appropriate boundaries between administrative systems and adaptive 
systems, and championing ideas created by the adaptive systems. Shared attributes 
amongst many of these techniques were the leadership qualities of self-awareness, self-
regulation, empathy, and social skills. 
Although the findings were limited to the eight incidents described, certain 
inferences can be made and additional research conducted to build upon this study’s 
reliability. One such inference is that enabling leaders must leverage a wide range of skill 
sets and leadership attributes to impact one or more of the five leadership techniques 
identified herein effectively to aid in the creation of enabling environments. Another 
inference is that in many cases they require the support of leadership from outside the 
current operational environment to ensure success. The implications of these findings 
support the notion that for an emergency management system to effectively create and 
support emergent behavior, the presence of factors that enhance or inhibit emergence 
may not be enough. These factors must be augmented and supported by the overall 
organizational structure and facilitated through the employment of enabling leaders. 
Additional research should be conducted to explore possible ways for emergency 
management organizations to provide for enabling leaders through recruitment, ongoing 
training, and the creation of an organizational culture that supports innovation. 
If the emergency management community can effectively foster leadership that 
has the ability to vacillate between the slow, deliberate environment most appropriate for 
administrative and legislative changes and the dynamic and rapidly changing 
environment created by disaster response and recovery operations, it may indeed be able 
to facilitate the creation of resilient communities. When emergency management 
personnel and the public at large have the ability to interact effectively, not through 
command and control, but through coordination and collaboration, they all become 
members of a single system adapting to their complex environment, and displaying 
emergent properties that move them toward a common goal. 
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